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THINKING LIKE NON-LAWYERS:  WHY EMPATHY IS A 
CORE LAWYERING SKILL AND WHY LEGAL EDUCATION 
SHOULD CHANGE TO REFLECT ITS IMPORTANCE 
 
Ian Gallacher* 
 
We are all familiar with the famous dictum that law school should train its students 
to “think like lawyers.”1  In fact, we are likely so familiar with the words, and the 
concept behind them, that we rarely stop to consider the fact that a substantial 
amount of lawyer communication occurs with non-lawyers; people who have not 
received the same systematic training as lawyers and who, according to the implicit 
message of the dictum, think very differently from the lawyers who are trying to 
communicate with them.  And because all lawyers have participated in 
fundamentally the same educational process, and have been trained to emphasize 
the importance of logic at the expense of all other responses to facts and law, we 
likely have given little thought to the important role empathy plays in real-life 
lawyering. 
 
This article seeks to explore the nature of empathy in lawyer-to-non-lawyer 
communication and to describe why empathy – just as much as knowledge of 
applicable laws and rules and an ability to synthesize and distinguish precedent – is 
a core lawyering skill.  It also discusses how current legal education practices are 
designed systematically to eliminate empathy from law students and why this is a 
mistake that can affect a lawyer’s ability to communicate with juries, clients, and 
the other non-lawyers with whom a lawyer comes into contact, And it will conclude 
that law schools should make core changes in the way they teach their students and 
that attention to empathy as a critical lawyering skill should begin before law 
school begins, should continue throughout all three years of formal legal education, 
and should continue after law students graduate from law school. 
 
                                            
*  Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law.  An early version of portions 
of this article was presented at “Once Upon A Legal Time,” the second biennial international applied 
legal storytelling conference at the Lewis and Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon.  Thanks to Dean 
Hannah Arterian for her support, both personal and professional, in making this article possible, to 
Dean Philip McConnaughay, the faculty, and staff at the Lewis Katz building of Penn State’s 
Dickinson School of Law for giving an itinerant faculty member a home during the summer of 2009, 
and to Professor Penny Pether, who planted the seed of this article many years ago.  Thanks also to 
the indefatigable Katharine Laubach who handled all my research requests with grace and skill, to 
Bailey McKinstry for her company during the writing process, and to Charles Goodell, who taught 
me many years ago about the importance of empathy for trial lawyers and the power of “standing 
tall.”  This is for Jean McKinstry, a person whose life embodied empathy, and, as always, for her 
daughter Julie. 
1  KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, 116 (Oceana, 1996). 
2 
 
The problem is not one of the legal writing curriculum’s making, although legal 
writing, which focuses on training law students to communicate with other lawyers, 
and which stresses a “lawyer-like” approach to analysis, tends to affirm rather than 
contradict the lessons students learn in their doctrinal classes.  But while legal 
writing training might not have caused legal education to seek the elimination of 
empathy from its students, it holds the key to restoring empathy to its appropriate 
role as a crucial skill for all lawyers.  Writing is an empathetic act, and the goal of 
persuasive writers is to place themselves in their audience’s minds in order to 
understand how best to influence them while they make their decisions.  The 
lessons legal writing faculty teach about writing and reading could easily be 
adapted so that empathy could take its place besides the more traditional law school 
emphasis on logical analysis and could be emphasized before and after students 
come to law school, as well as during their time as law students.. 
 
The notion that empathy is so important to lawyers that it warrants a rethinking of 
the law school curriculum is doubtless controversial to some.  Indeed, it is easy 
these days to walk into the legal empathy minefield but less easy to emerge 
unscathed.2  And as some have noted, “empathy” is not a word that carries much 
                                            
2    I am not alone in discussing this controversial issue.  A brief and incomplete summary of 
recent scholarly work on empathy in the law shows that it has been a popular subject for study:  
Kristin B. Gerdy,  Clients, Empathy, and Compassion:  Introducing First-Year Students to the 
“Heart” of Lawyering,  87 Neb. L. Rev. 1 (2008);  William D. Casebeer,  Identity, Culture and Stories:  
Empathy and the War on Terrorism,  9 Minn. L. L. Sci. & Tech. 653 (2008);  Claire A. Hill,  
Introduction to the Symposium:  Self and Other:  Cognitive Perspectives on Trust, Empathy and the 
Self,  9 Minn. J. L Sci. & Tech. 637 (2008);  Richard Warner,  Empathy and Compassion,  9 Minn. J. 
L Sci. & Tech. 813 (2008);  Jim Golden, H. Abigail Moy, & Adam Lyons,  The Negotiation Counsel 
Model:  An Empathetic Model for Settling Catastrophic Personal Injury Cases,  13 Harv. Negot. L. 
Rev. 21 (2008);  Marc D. Falkoff,  Conspiracy to Commit Poetry: Empathetic Lawyering at 
Guantanamo Bay,  6 Seattle J. Soc. Just. 3 (2007);  Sharisse O’Carroll,  Empathy, Courage and 
Diligence:  Three Things I Wish I’d Learned in my Law School Ethics Course,  17 Prof. Lawyer 24 
(No. 1 2006);  Amnon Reichman,  Law, Literature, and Empathy:  Between Withholding and 
Reserving Judgment,  56 J. Legal Educ. 296 (2006);  Jody Lynee Madeira,  Recognizing Odysseus’ 
Scar:  Reconceptualizing Pain and its Empathic Role in Civil Adjudication,  34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 41 
(2006);  Jody Lynee Madeira,  Regarding Pained Sympathy and Sympathy Pains:  Reason, Morality, 
and Empathy in the Civil Adjudication of Pain,  58 S. C. L. Rev. 415 (2006);  Craig Haney,  
Condemning The Other in Death Penalty Trials:  Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation, and 
the Empathic Divide,  53 DePaul L. Rev. 1557 (2004);  Abbe Smith,  Too Much Heart and Not 
Enough Heat:  The Short Life And Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic Public Defender,  37 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1203 (2004);  Susan Nauss Exon,  The Best Interest of the Child:  Going Beyond 
Legalize to Empathize with a Client’s Leap of Faith,  24 J. Juv. L. 1 (2003-04);  Laurel E. Fletcher & 
Harvey M. Weinstein,  When Students Lose Perspective:  Clinical Supervision and the Management of 
Empathy,  9 Clinical L. Rev. 135 (2002-03);  V. Pualani Enos & Lois H. Kanter,  Who’s Listening?  
Introducing Students to Client-Centered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving 
in a Clinical Setting,  9 Clinical L. Rev. 83 (2002-03);  Scott E. Sundby,  The Capital Jury and 
Empathy:  The Problem of Worthy and Unworthy Victims,  88 Cornell L. Rev. 343 (2002-03);  Rachel 
D. Godsil,  Expressivism, Empathy And Equality,  36 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 247 (2002-03);  Michael 
J. Zimmer,  Systemic Empathy,  34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.575 (2002-03);  Jeanne L. Schroeder,  
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authority.3  Lynne Henderson has observed that “[e]mpathy has become a favorite 
word in critical and feminist scholarship.  Unfortunately, it is never defined or 
described – it is seemingly tossed in as a ‘nice’ word in opposition to something bad 
or undesirable. . . .”4  More recently, the word has become a political plaything, with 
President Obama declaring, in his search to replace Justice Souter on the Supreme 
Court bench, that empathy is “an essential ingredient for arriving at just decisions 
and outcomes”5 and Senator Jeff Sessions replying that he was “troubled” by 
President Obama’s use of the “empathy standard” when selecting federal judges:6 
 
[T]his view – that a judge should use his or her personal feelings about 
a particular group or issues to decide a case -- . . .  stands in stark 
contrast to the impartiality that we expect in the American courtroom.  
If a judge is allowed to let his or her feelings for one party in the case 
sway his decision, hasn’t that judge then demonstrated a bias against 
the other party?  And, if a judge is allowed to inject his personal views 
into the interpretation of the law, does he not then have a license to 
rewrite the laws to fit his own preferences? 
 
I fear that this ‘empathy standard’ is another step down the path to a 
cynical, relativistic, results-oriented world: 
 
• Where words and laws have no fixed meaning; 
• Where unelected judges set policy; 
• And where Constitutional limits on government power are ignored 
when they are inconvenient to the powerful. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Economic Rationality, Empathy, and Corporate Responsibility,  70 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 875 (2002);  
Joshua D. Rosenberg,  Teaching Empathy in Law School,  36 U. S. F. L. Rev. 621 (2001-02);  Justin 
D’Arms,  Empathy and Evaluative Enquiry,  74 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1467 (1998-2000);  Lynda Olsen-
Fulero & Solomon M. Fulero,  An Empathy-Complexity Theory of Rape Juror Story Making,  3 
Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 402 (1997);  Sheldon Nahmod,  The Restructuring of Narrative and Empathy 
in Section 1983 Cases,  72 Chi-Kent L. Rev.819 (1996-97);  Teresa Bruce,  The Empathy Principle,  6 
Law & Sexuality 109 (1996);  Caroline Forell,  Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Woman,  
1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 769 (1994);  Stephen Ellman,  Empathy and Approval,  43 Hastings L. J. 991 
(1991-92);  Toni M. Massaro,  Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law:  New Words, Old 
Wounds,  87 Mich. L. Rev. 2099 (1988-89);  Lynne N. Henderson,  Legality and Empathy  85 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1574 (1986-87). 
3  Massaro, supra n. 2, at 2106.   
4  Lynne N. Henderson,  Legality and Empathy  85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1578 (1986-87). 
5  Peter Slevin,  Obama Makes Empathy a Requirement for Court,  Washington Post (May 19, 
2009), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/05/12/AR2009051203515.html. 
6  Senator Jefferson Sessions,  Weekly Republican Address (June 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.gop.com/News/NewsRead.aspx?Guid=ebbe52d7-8d7b-4f2c-9c87-924b2e06e806. 
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This standard is deeply troubling because it is contradictory to our 
country’s long heritage of a faithful and impartial adherence to the 
rule of law.7 
 
In light of this controversy, my description of “empathy” as a core lawyering skill 
might surprise some.  But once the baggage commonly freighted with the word is 
unpacked, its relevance to lawyers can readily be appreciated.  In the context of this 
article, I use the word in its simple, dictionary, meaning -- “[t]he power of projecting 
one’s personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation.”8   
 
Indeed, as Martha Nussbaum observes, empathy is neither a good nor a bad thing. 
 
Empathy by itself . . . is ethically neutral.  A good sadist or torturer 
has to be highly empathetic to understand what would cause his or her 
victim maximal pain.  Nor, I believe, is empathy always necessary for 
compassion:  we can have compassion for the sufferings of non-human 
animals without being able to put ourselves inside their minds.9 
 
And viewed in the context of this narrow interpretation, empathy can be seen to be 
of extraordinary value to lawyers.  A lawyer who can project him or herself into the 
thoughts of another and understand how that person – juror, witness, judge, or 
other lawyer, for example – is thinking, has the ability to calibrate language, 
posture, and gesture in a manner calculated to persuade the subject to believe 
whatever argument the lawyer is making.  Conversely, a lawyer who fails to make 
this empathetic connection with others will find it much more difficult – perhaps 
even impossible – to communicate effectively and persuasively, especially with non-
lawyers. 
  
Before we consider how lawyers might become more empathetically attuned,  we 
must first step back and consider why and how the legal education process causes 
lawyers, especially younger lawyers, to overemphasize a more logical approach at 
the expense of empathy.  That discussion forms part one of this article.10  Part two 
will discuss the commonplace notion of a lawyer’s case theory as narrative, but will 
                                            
7  Id.  Senator Sessions was, of course, reprising the familiar trope that judges should respond 
logically, and only logically, to the facts of cases brought before them.  This is an extension of the 
idea that lawyers should ‘think like lawyers’ at all times. 
8  Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989), available at http://dictionary.oed.com.  Apparently, 
the word came into the language in the early twentieth century through the aesthetic literature as a 
translation of the German “Einfühlung.  Id.   It is worth noting, in passing, that there is no entry for 
“empathy” in Black’s Law Dictionary.  If any special meaning is asserted on the word’s behalf, then, 
it appears that such meaning has not become universally accepted as a legal term by the legal 
community. 
9  Martha Nussbaum,  Reply to Amnon Reichman,  56 J. Legal Educ. 320, 325 (2006). 
10  Footnotes 16-53, infra, and accompanying text. 
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also explore the communicative nature of the multiple narratives that interact 
during trial and the intertextual,11 or internarrative relationship between them.12 
 
The idea of dueling internarrative relationships sets up the question of what 
happens when a lawyer’s narrative theory conflicts with the jury’s collective 
narrative expectations because of the lawyer’s empathetic failure to understand 
those expectations, and, by contrast, what can happen when a lawyer is 
empathetically well-attuned to both the witness and the jury’s reception of the 
witness’ testimony.  That discussion forms part three of this article, which examines 
in detail three cases that stand as proxies for familiar lawyering tropes:  the 
unsuccessful prosecution theory in the O. J. Simpson case, which represents a 
failure to appreciate the jury’s cultural perspective on the facts of the case;  a case 
from the Vioxx litigation that displays the sometimes unsuccessful corporate 
defense approach that relies heavily on scientific data and objective fact; and the 
Triangle Shirtwaist case which presents a successful example of tactical empathy, 
showing how effective a skillful lawyer who listens to what a witness actually says, 
and who understands how to communicate with juries, can be.   The article will seek 
to explain the potential impact on juries of these various approaches.13  
 
Finally, part four will look suggest ways in which lawyer training, including pre and 
post-law school training as well as the education that happens during the three 
years of formal legal training, might change to make junior lawyers more effective 
communicators.14  Especially at a time when American college students are 
measurably, and dramatically, less empathetic than they used to be,15  law schools 
do law students, lawyers, and society, a disservice by systematically eliminating the 
empathetic response of law students and that they should reverse course and start 
emphasizing the value of empathy together with the more traditional, logic-based, 
approach to legal analysis.   
 
This article will conclude that legal education should train law students to react 
both logically and empathetically to factual situations, and that this training – 
which could begin even before students come to law school – should continue all the 
way through law school and even after students have graduated.     
 
  
                                            
11  “Intertextuality” is a term given to the phenomenon whereby one text operates on another to 
create new meanings. “Intertextuality is the current and comprehensive literary term for the concept 
that each text exists in relation to others and is framed by other texts in many ways.”  Jeffrey 
Fischer,  Killing at Close Range:  A Study in Intertextuality  95 The English Journal 27, 28 (2006). 
12  Footnotes 54-70, infra, and accompanying text. 
13  Footnotes 75-166, infra, and accompanying text. 
14  Footnotes 167-178, infra, and accompanying text. 
15  Footnotes 201-02, infra, and accompanying text. 
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 A. Thinking And Communicating Like A Lawyer 
 
The origins of the American law school curriculum in the work of Christopher 
Columbus Langdell, dean of Harvard law school during the formative years of legal 
education in this country, are well known.16  The process by which law was taught 
under Langdell, and by which it is mostly taught today as well, relies on the 
analysis of judicial opinions “in a scientific spirit as specimens from which general 
principles and doctrines could be abstracted.  Once formulated, these doctrines 
would be used to classify the fast-expanding mass of American legal decisions, 
forming the body of law into fields such as contract law, tort law, and criminal 
law.”17  Law school’s “signature”18 pedagogical approach – the so-called “Socratic”19 
method,20 used especially in the first year of legal education, is intended to help 
students develop a different set of analytical skills from those they have previously 
employed. 
 
Karl Llewellyn observed that “[the first year of law school] aims, in the old phrase, 
to get you ‘thinking like a lawyer,’”21 and few would disagree that this is what law 
schools attempt to do.22  The question implicit in this notion, though, is how should 
lawyers, or at least law students, think?  Llewellyn was in no doubt that lawyers 
should be trained as cool, unemotional, thinkers and that is was the job of law 
school to impose this analytical style onto law students who might initially be 
uncomfortable with it:  “The hardest job of the first year is to lop off your common 
sense, to knock your ethics into temporary anesthesia.  Your view of social policy, 
                                            
16  For a discussion of Langdell’s importance in the development of the law school curriculum, 
see, Catherine Pierce Wells,  Langdell and the Invention of Legal Doctrine,  58 BUFF. L.REV. 551 
(2010). 
17  WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL,  EDUCATING LAWYERS:  PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF 
LAW (the “Carnegie Report”), 5-6 (2007). 
18  Id. at 24. 
19  I say “so-called” because, as Martha Nussbaum notes, the process is not, in fact, very 
Socratic.  “Emphasis is placed on the ability to give quick answers, and to admit to being puzzled – a 
key Socratic virtue – will not get the student very far.  Silence and introspective searching, often the 
hallmarks of good Socratic inquiry, are not much in evidence in the law school classroom.  The 
classroom culture usually values assertiveness, quickness, and confidence – qualities we associate 
more with Socrates’s interlocutors, such as Euthyphro and Critias, rather than with Socrates 
himself.  In examinations, it is often more of the same:  the ability cleverly to amass and organize a 
lot of material in a short time is the road to success, rather than the patient searching characteristic 
of Socratic inquiry.”  Martha C. Nussbaum,  Cultivating Humanity in Legal Education,  70 U. CHI. L. 
REV.  265, 272-73 (2003). 
20  Carnegie Report, supra n. 17, at 3. 
21  Supra, n. 1. 
22  The phrase is difficult to separate from its most famous reading, that by John Houseman in 
his role as Professor Kingsfield.  The Paper Chase;  Pilot (CBS television broadcast September 7, 1978). 
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your sense of justice – to knock these out of you along with woozy thinking, along 
with ideas all fuzzed along their edges.”23 
 
As things were in Llewellyn’s time, so they are today.  The authors of the recent 
Carnegie Report on legal education noted that  
 
a concentrated focus on the details of particular cases, disconnected 
from consideration of the larger purposes of the law, begins very early 
in law school.  In their all-consuming first year, students are told 
repeatedly to focus on the procedural and formal aspects of legal 
reasoning, its ‘hard’ edge, with the ‘soft’ sides of the law, especially 
moral concerns or compassion for clients and concerns for substantive 
justice, either tacitly or explicitly pushed to the sidelines.24 
 
The Carnegie Report’s authors continued that “[t]his focus is justified on 
pedagogical grounds, with an implied assumption that law school can flip off the  of 
ethical and human concern, teach legal analysis, and later, when students have 
mastered the central intellectual skill of thinking like a lawyer, flip the switch back 
on.”25 
 
In fact, data suggest that the majority of those drawn to the law are likely to be 
comfortable with this approach.  In a 1997 article, Susan Daicoff summarized the 
research on incoming law students and concluded that they 
 
appear to have various distinguishing characteristics as children and 
college students.  They are highly focused on academics, have greater 
needs for dominance, leadership, and attention, and prefer initiating 
activity. . . .  They may have experienced a greater emphasis on 
scholastic achievement, reading, self-discipline, and the channeling of 
impulses into expression in their families. . . .  Their fathers were 
                                            
23  Llewellyn, supra n. 1, at 116.  Llewellyn goes on to note that the process is not without its 
dangers, since the “legal machine” created out of the incoming law student “is not even a good 
lawyer.  It lacks insight and judgment.”  Id.  Nonetheless, Llewellyn concludes, it is vital for the 
nascent lawyer to experience this dehumanization first, trusting that at some undefined point in 
their post-law school experience, “the sapiens we shall then duly endeavor to develop will, we hope, 
regain the homo.”  Id. at 101.  This disclaimer sounds a somewhat discordant note, since if lawyers 
must add humanity back into their personalities at some point after the first year of law school, the 
“lawyers” first year students are being trained to think like, in fact, do not think that way. 
24  Carnegie Report, supra n. 17, at 141. 
25  Id. 
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likely dominant and strong. . . .  They may have had good social skills, 
but a low interest in emotion or others’ feelings.26 
 
Significantly, a study conducted in the 1990s concluded that most law students can 
be classified as “thinkers” than as “feelers.”27  Summarizing the study’s results, 
Daicoff noted that: 
 
Those who prefer to make decisions on the basis of Thinking prefer to 
come to closure in a logical, orderly manner.  They can readily discern 
inaccuracies and are often critical.  They can easily hurt others feelings 
without knowing it.  They are excellent problem solvers.  They review 
the cause and effect of potential actions before deciding.  Thinkers are 
often accused of being cold and somewhat calculating because their 
decisions do not reflect their own personal values.  They focus on 
discovering truth, and they seek justice. 
 
Those who prefer to make decisions on the basis of Feeling apply their 
own personal values to make choices.  They seek harmony and, 
therefore, are sensitive to the effect  of their decisions on others.  They 
need, and are adept at giving, praise.  They are interested in the 
person behind the idea or the job.  They seek to do what is right for 
themselves and other people and are interested in mercy.28 
 
The Bell and Richard study showed that “76.5% of lawyers sampled preferred 
“Thinking” over “Feeling”, while only 47.5% of the population preferred the same.29  
And a 1967 study found that the personality type most prevalent in law school is 
“dependable and practical with a realistic respect for facts, who absorbs and 
remembers great numbers of facts and is able to cite cases to support his 
evaluations and who emphasizes analysis, logic and decisiveness.”30  Students with 
these characteristics dropped out of law school 6.7% of the time, whereas students 
                                            
26  Susan Daicoff,  Lawyer Know Thyself:  A Review Of Empirical Research On Attorney 
Attributes Bearing On Professionalism,  46 Am. U. L. Rev.  1337, 1349-50 (1996-97)(citations 
omitted). 
27  The “thinking/feeling” dichotomy is one of the four continua evaluated by the Myers-Briggs 
Type indicator.  Susan Daicoff,  Lawyer, Be Thyself:  An Empirical Investigation of the Relationship 
Between the Ethic of Care, The Feeling Decisionmaking Preference, And Lawyer Wellbeing,  16 Va. J. 
Soc. Pol’y & L. 87, 112 (2008).  The “[t]hinking/[f]eeling decision-making preference refers not so 
much to emotions or to what one ultimately decides to do, in a dilemmas, as it does to the 
justifications, bases, or reasons one articulates for one’s decisions.”  Id. at 113. 
28  Daicoff, supra n. 26, at 1366, quoting Susan J. Bell and Lawrence R. Richard,  Anatomy of a 
Lawyer:  Personality and Long-Term Career Satisfaction, in FULL DISCLOSURE:  DO YOU REALLY 
WANT TO BE A LAWYER?, 149, 152 (Susan J. Bell ed., 2d ed. 1992). 
29  Daicoff, supra n. 26, at 1365, citing Bell & Richard, supra n. 29, at 229-30. 
30  Daicoff, supra n. 26, at 1367, citing Paul Van R. Miller, Personality Differences and Student 
Survival in Law School,  19 J. Legal Educ. 460, 466 (1967). 
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who were “concerned chiefly with people, who value[] harmonious human contacts, 
[are] friendly, tactful, sympathetic, and loyal, who [are] warmed by approval and 
bothered by indifference and who tend[] to idealize what [they] admire[],” dropped 
out of law school at the higher rate of 28.1%.31 
 
In a study that appears to support these conclusions, Norman Solkoff showed that 
“the lowest-ranked law students tended to obtain higher humanitarian scores,”32 a 
result that, as Daicoff noted, was “consistent with later studies’ findings’ that 
individuals who are more people-oriented . . . are more likely to either drop out of 
law school . . . or be dissatisfied as attorneys.”33  Although these studies were 
conducted some time ago, their results were replicated in 1994, “suggesting that 
this preference has remained relatively consistent over time and independent of 
gender influence.”34 
 
Many law students, then, come to law school with a predisposition in favor of the 
prevalent pedagogical style to be found there.  For those who do not, the empathetic 
response is systematically trained out of them in a first-year curriculum in which 
most, if not all, their doctrinal classes share the common attribute of changing the 
way they think, from intelligent laypeople to “lawyers.”  And while the process of 
teaching students to “think like lawyers” defines law school, it is not without its 
costs.  The disambiguation of life used by legal educators to compel students to 
‘think like lawyers’ desaturates the landscape presented by the cases the students 
study.  Perhaps this brings some of the scene’s elements into sharper focus, but the 
process renders the entire picture monochromatic, flat, and sterile.   
 
In considering the law school approach, the Carnegie Report observes that  
 
such a critical transition point in professional development needs to be 
approached with great care.  It is not surprising that students can be 
quite confused when the professor turns [the ethical] switch off.  Many 
in our focus groups expressed this sort of confusion about what they 
feared were the implications of this dispassionate perspective for the 
                                            
31  Id.  Thomas Mauet offers a pithy summary of the behavioral science research in this area, 
noting that “’[t]hey,’ the jurors, do not think and decide like ‘us,’ the lawyers.”  THOMAS A, MAUET,  
TRIAL TECHNIQUES, 13 (8th ed. 2010). 
32  Daicoff, Lawyer Know Thyself, supra n. 26, at 1364, citing Norman Solkoff, The Use of 
Personality and Attitude Tests in Predicting the Academic Success of Medical and Law Students,  43 
J. Med. Educ. 1250, 1252 (1968). 
33  Daicoff, supra n. 26, at 1364-65, citing Miller, supra n. 31, at 460-67. 
34  Daicoff, supra n. 26, at 1365-66, citing Lawrence R. Richard, Psychological Type and Job 
Satisfaction Among Practicing Lawyers in the United States at 229-30 (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation on file with Temple University). 
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nature of their role as lawyers, diminishing their hopes that they 
might serve substantive goods in their careers.35 
 
Others have speculated that this approach to legal education, combined with the 
stresses of studying and practicing the law, is harmful to law students.36  While the 
evidence is strongly supportive of this conclusion, however, my concerns with the 
legal education process here are more limited and more obvious:  to the extent we 
succeed in making our students only think as lawyers, we make it difficult, if not 
impossible, for them to think like non-lawyers.  And that, in turn, makes it more 
difficult for them to communicate with non-lawyers, as they must do much of the 
time. 
 
A recent study of the power of story in legal writing lends support to the notion that 
new lawyers are strongly influenced by logic, and less so by pathos, or emotional 
reasoning.37  In the study, Professor Kenneth Chestek drafted a series of briefs 
around a hypothetical case.38  Two of these briefs were “information-based 
narratives”39 or based on logical reasoning and two were “story briefs”40 or based on 
emotional reasoning.  Chestek then submitted the briefs to appellate judges, law 
clerks, appellate court staff attorneys, appellate lawyers, and law professors and 
asked them to rate the briefs for their ability to persuade.41 
 
Once the results were tabulated, the story, or emotional reasoning, briefs were 
considered to be more persuasive.42  Significantly though, for our purposes at any 
rate, Chestek found that “participants with less job experience (especially including 
law clerks) tended to rate the logos brief more highly than more experiences 
participants did.”43  One of the explanations for this result, Chestek believed, might 
be that “law schools tend to teach that ‘thinking like a lawyer’ means breaking a 
fact pattern44 into small, abstract pieces, applying logical rules to those fragments, 
                                            
35  Carnegie Report, supra n. 17, at 141. 
36  See, e.g.,  Lawrence S. Krieger,  Institutional Denial about the Dark Side of Law School, and 
Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence,  52 J. Legal Educ. 112, 117 
(2002)(“Thinking ‘like a lawyer’ is fundamentally negative;  it is critical, pessimistic, and 
depersonalizing.  It is a damaging paradigm in law schools because it is usually conveyed, and 
understood, as a new and superior way of thinking, rather than an important but limited legal tool.”) 
37  Kenneth D. Chestek,  Judging by the Numbers:  An Empirical Study of the Power of Story  7 
J ALWD 1 (2010).  Another way of putting this, although in less strictly rhetorical terms, would be to 
say that these lawyers are less empathetic than more experienced lawyers and judges. 
38  Id., at 8. 
39  Id., at 10. 
40  Id. 
41  Id., at 8. 
42  Id., at 29. 
43  Id. 
44  Chestek does not note this in his article, but lawyers are likely the only group who use the 
term “fact pattern” to describe what almost anyone else would consider simply as “facts.”  The phrase 
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and then reasoning your way to a conclusion through syllogisms, analogies, or other 
logical processes.”45 
 
Chestek’s survey suggests that law schools do their job well, and that they produce 
graduates who are persuaded by writing that emphasizes logic over emotion.46  This 
should come as no surprise, since they are the product of a training scheme 
designed to convince them that lawyers think differently from non-lawyers:  
“[T]here are idiosyncratic aspects to legal logic not necessarily found in other 
disciplines.  Unlike reflective reasoning in everyday life, the statement of belief in 
our major proposition in law must come from some authority.  We cannot start with 
a proposition simply because we have always believed it.”47  The legal writing 
programs in law schools, for the most part, reinforce this message by training first 
year law students how best to communicate with other lawyers, using the 
structures and symbols familiar to generations of lawyers trained in fundamentally 
the same way.  
 
Lawyers have, to be sure, changed the way they write in recent years.  The days of 
dense, opaque language as a desirable medium of legal communication appear to be 
over and clear, plain English is now generally preferred.48  And there is increased 
                                                                                                                                            
is strongly evocative of the first year of law school, and the addition of the word “pattern” suggests a 
distancing effect, as if we are no longer looking at facts that happened to real people or entities, but 
rather are looking clinically at connected packets of information.  In fact, Chestek’s use of this 
phrase acts as a perfect rhetorical model of the process he describes. 
45  Id.  The other reason Chestek proposes for this result lies in the nature of a law clerk’s job 
as, in essence, a judge’s lawyer.  “Law clerks may tend to view their job as helping their judge find 
the relevant rules of law;  thus briefs that focus more on the law (rather than the story) are more 
useful for that purpose.”  Id., at 30.  While this is a plausible explanation, it undercuts, to an extent, 
the instructions Chestek gave to the survey participants, which asked them to rate the briefs they 
read for persuasiveness  (id., at 18) rather than utility.   
46  Id., at 31 (“All of this suggests that lawyers who have most recently graduated from law 
school are likely to be persuaded by logical argumentation, since they think that’s what ‘thinking 
like a lawyer’ means.”)  The overall results of the study also suggest that lawyers, in time, become 
increasingly less persuaded by logic and are more persuaded by emotional reasoning.  Id. (“[the 
study’s results suggested that] the more job experience one has, the less likely one was to find the 
logos brief more persuasive”).  Perhaps, then, Chestek’s survey is empirical support for Llewellyn’s 
hope that the law-school created sapiens gradually regains its amputated homo.  See, n. 23. 
47  RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS:  A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING, 36 (3d. ed. 
1997).  While this is the message legal education sends to its students, it is unclear whether the 
message is correct or not.  “Legal writing teachers ‘fervently believe that learning legal reading and 
writing involved the acquisition of unique cognitive processes and skills,’ but they ‘cannot point to 
formal empirical evidence verifying the uniqueness.’”  Linda L. Berger,  Applying New Rhetoric to 
Legal Discourse:  The Ebb and Flow of Reader and Writer, Text and Context,  49 J. Legal Educ. 155, 
166 (1999), quoting,  James F. Stratman,  The Emergence of Legal Composition as a Field of Inquiry:  
Evaluating the Prospects,  60 Rev. Educ. Res. 153, 210 (1990). 
48  See, e.g..,  BRYAN A. GARNER,  LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH (2001);  RICHARD C. WYDICK,  
PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (5th ed. 2005).  There are still some critics of the plain English 
12 
 
sensitivity to the language lawyers use when writing documents that will be read by 
the general public.49  Moreover, there is an increased interest in the power of 
narrative, and especially to the role of rhetoric50 and storytelling51 in legal 
communication. 
 
Nonetheless, the emphasis in legal education, at least in the most formative first 
year, is on training law students to communicate with other lawyers, either in 
writing52 or in the formal and stylized language of oral argument before a judge or 
group of judges.53  And this can prove to be a problem when the logical, “thinking” 
lawyers that law school has selected and constructed come into contact with 
members of the general public, who might not reach their decisions in the same way 
as those with legal training. 
 
 B. Dueling Narratives and Close Encounters 
  With Narratives of the Third Kind 
 
The conflict between lawyers trained to think in only one way about a problem and 
the general public, which can be more willing to entertain other ways of viewing a 
set of facts, is most dramatically presented by trials.54  In these contemporary 
                                                                                                                                            
movement in the law.  See, e.g.,  David Crump,  Against Plain English:  The Case for a Functional 
Approach to Legal Document Preparation,  33 Rutgers L.J. 713 (2002). 
49  See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR 
SEC DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS (1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf.   
50  Two examples of the increasing interest in rhetoric and the law are Volume three of the 
Journal of the Association of Legal Writing Directors, dedicated to “rhetoric and argumentation,” and 
Mercer University School of Law’s Law and Rhetoric Workshop, held in January, 2009, as an adjunct 
to that year’s American Association of Law Schools Conference in San Diego. 
51  The Chestek survey was discussed at the second storytelling conference as was an early 
version of this article.  A third storytelling conference will be held in 2011 in Denver.  The first 
swelling of interest in legal storytelling appears to have occurred in the late 1980s.  See, e.g.,  Kim 
Lane Scheppele,  Forward:  Telling Stories,  87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073 (1989)(foreword to legal 
storytelling symposium issue of the Michigan Law Review, asking “Why is there such a rush to 
storytelling?  Why has narrative become such an important and recurring theme in legal scholarship 
these days?”)(citations omitted). 
52  See, e.g., RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR.,  LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING:  STRUCTURE, 
STRATEGY, AND STYLE, 48  (6th. ed. 2009)( (observing that the “typical” reader of a law student’s 
future work will be a “judge or [attorney] supervisor.” 
53  See, e.g., id., at 415-36.  Later in law school, students usually have the option of taking trial 
advocacy classes that help to prepare them to present evidence at trial.  Although I have no 
empirical evidence to support this, experience suggests that these classes – although dealing 
somewhat with how to communicate directly to a jury of non-lawyers – are more concerned with the 
formalities of conducting direct and cross-examinations and of the mechanics of introducing evidence 
and preventing evidence from being introduced. 
54  While this article focuses on trials as the medium for this discussion of the role of empathy in 
the practice of law, the underlying themes this article seeks to explore are applicable to all aspects of 
law practice. 
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manifestations of the medieval trial-by-combat, lawyers for all sides in a conflict55 
construct narratives from the testimony and other introduced evidence that are 
designed to persuade the fact-finders to decide in their clients’ favor. 
 
The idea that a trial is a highly formalized forum for story-telling appears to be 
generally accepted.56  Although lawyers have their own term for the story they 
intend to tell – the “theory of the case” – the essential elements of the process 
should be recognizable to any storyteller: 
 
A theory is worth arguing if it stands a significant chance of being 
adopted by the judge or jury who must adjudicate the dispute.  The 
more a theory satisfies the following criteria, the greater its chances of 
adoption. 
 
1.  Does the theory “[a]ccount for or explain all of . . . the undeniable 
facts?” . . . 
 
2.  Does the theory “explain away in a plausible manner as many 
unfavorable facts as it can”? . . . 
 
3.  Does the theory “[e]xplain why people acted in the way they did”?    
. . . 
 
4.  Is the theory “supported by the details”? . . . 
 
5.  Does the theory have a solid basis in law? . . . 
 
6.  Is the theory “consistent with common sense and . . . plausible”?57 
 
The limits of a trial’s storytelling universe are defined by ethics, on the one hand,58 
and the applicable rules of evidence, and the court’s rulings on evidence and 
testimony, on the other.  Within the boundaries of that universe, though, lawyers 
                                            
55  Most evocations of trials presuppose the simple X v. Y model, and this article will largely do 
so as well.  But we should not ignore the increasingly common complex civil case in which there can 
be multiple parties on either side of the “v.”.  
56  See, e.g.  Mauet, supra n. 31, at 27 (Effective storytelling is the basis for much of what occurs 
during a trial, including the opening statement, direct examinations, and closing arguments.”  Small 
wonder, them, that good lawyers are invariably good storytellers.”) 
57  Neumann, supra. n. 52, at 296-97 (citations omitted). 
58  For a stimulating discussion of the ethical boundaries of what has been termed “applied legal 
storytelling,” see Steven J. Johansen,  Was Colonel Sanders a Terrorist?:  An Essay on the Ethical 
Limits of Applied Legal Storytelling  7 J ALWD 63 (2010). 
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are free to use all narrative and rhetorical devices available to them to present their 
case theory to the jury in the best possible light for their client.59 
 
Often overlooked in descriptions of the trial process, however, is the fact that a 
lawyer’s case theory is not presented in a vacuum.  Instead, it is presented as one of 
at least two theories, each of which is constructed on the same criteria as those 
outlined above.60  And one of the ways a trial can be viewed is as a tournament at 
which champions – in the form of opposing case theories, or narratives, created by 
the attorneys – duel for the jury’s approval and acceptance.61  The jury is told about 
the characteristics each champion will possess during preliminary statements, 
observes the construction of these champions during the evidentiary stage of trial, 
and is introduced to the fully-formed champion during closing arguments, but the 
duel itself does not (or should not) begin until the jury has had the rules of this 
particular tournament explained to them, in the form of the court’s instructions on 
the law, and retires to the jury room to deliberate.62  As it turns out, though, the 
two champions are not the only competitors in the tournament, just the two that the 
lawyers get to see. 
 
The process by which a jury reaches its verdict has been modeled by Reid Hastie 
and Nancy Pennington, who have coined the term “Explanation-based Decision 
Making” to describe their conclusions.63  According to this model, the duel between 
                                            
59  Two recent articles discuss the unease some feel about the use of narrative and rhetoric in 
the legal process.  See, Johansen, supra n. 58, at 63-4 (“. . . I have been struck by a recurring sense of 
unease when the conversation turns to Applied Legal Storytelling.  We all recognize, perhaps 
intuitively, that stories are powerful.  But the unease comes from a concern that they may be too 
powerful, or perhaps inappropriately powerful.”);  J. Christopher Rideout,  Penumbral Thinking 
Revisited:  Metaphor in Legal Argumentation,  7 J ALWD 155, 156 (2010)(noting that Judge Cardozo 
“warned that although metaphors in the law can ‘liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.’”), 
quoting, Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co.,  155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).  Both writers conclude, however, 
that these techniques are and should be available for legal argumentation:  “[C]loser inspection of 
[legal] ethical concerns shows that storytelling is consistent with our existing norms about the 
ethical practice of law.”  Johansen, 7 J ALWD at 64;  “Metaphors are central to legal thinking, and, 
by adding flexibility, they help law accommodate complexity and change in human social 
experience.”  Rideout,  7 J ALWD at 190. 
60  As Mauet notes, this is usually true in civil trials and is often true in criminal cases.  Mauet, 
supra n. 31, at 24.  In criminal cases, however, the defense might offer a theory based on “the 
existence of reasonable doubt and . . . not [on] a competing version of reality.”  Id. 
61  Clients, whose assets, liberty, or – in the case of criminal prosecutions – desire for 
punishment, are at stake during trial, are likely to hold a more prosaic view of the nature of a trial. 
62  Juries are constantly warned during trial to not deliberate on the evidence or to start 
weighing their verdicts until all the evidence has been presented and until they are instructed on the 
law by the judge.  See, e.g.,  Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury Instructions, § 2.05 
(1997)(“Each of you must keep an open mind throughout the trial.  In the oath you just took you 
swore to do so.  You should avoid forming opinions about the guilt or innocence of the defendant or 
about any other disputed question until the trial is ended and you begin your deliberations.”) 
63  Reid Hastie and Nancy Pennington,  The O.J. Simpson Stories:  Behavioral Scientists’ 
Reflections on The People of the State of California v. Orenthal James Simpson,  67 U. Col. L. Rev. 
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the competing trial narratives is an intertextual, or internarrative one,64 in which 
meaning is generated by the relationship of one case narrative to the other and – 
crucially – by additional inferences transported into the jury room by the jurors 
themselves. 
 
The juror’s “explanation” of legal evidence takes the form of a “story” in 
which causal and intentional relations among events are prominent. . . 
.  The story is constructed both from information presented at trial and 
from the juror’s background knowledge.  Two kinds of background 
knowledge are critical:  (1) expectations about what makes a complete 
story and (2) knowledge about events similar to those that are central 
in the case. . . .  The story constructed by the juror will consist of some 
subset of the events and causal relationships referred to in the 
presentation of evidence, as well as additional events and causal 
relationships inferred by the juror.  Some of these inferences may be 
suggested by the attorneys and some may be constructed solely by the 
juror.  Whatever their source, the inferences will serve to fill out the 
episode structure of the story.  This constructive mental activity 
results in one or more interpretations of the evidence that have a 
narrative story form.65 
 
                                                                                                                                            
957, 957 (1996).  Hastie and Pennington’s theories are more fully explained in Nancy Pennington & 
Reid Hastie,  A Theory of Explanation-Based Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING IN ACTION:  
MODELS AND METHODS 188 (Gary A. Klein et al. eds., 1993). 
64  I have stolen “intertextuality” from the world of postmodernist literary theory and have 
shamelessly modified it to create the concept of “internarrativity” because trials, as opposed to 
motions and appellate practice, contain no formal, written, texts.  I merely intend to import the 
concept of intertextuality, not any of the additional postmodernist baggage it might attempt to bring 
with it.  For a discussion of the role of intertextuality in the construction of knowledge during the 
reading of legal texts, see James F. Stratman,  When Law Students Read Cases:  Exploring Relations 
Between Professional Legal Reasoning Roles and Problem Detection  34 Discourse Processes 57 
(2002). 
65  Hastie and Pennington, supra n. 63, at 960.  See also,  Marianne Wesson,  That’s My Story 
And I’m Stickin’ To It . . .:  The Jury As Fifth Business In The Trial Of O.J. Simpson And Other 
Matters,  67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 949, 954 (1996)(“I am suggesting that the juror is more storyteller than 
historian.  He seeks narrative truth, rather than historical truth . . . .  Juries that behave like 
storytellers’ collectives, as opposed to historians’ collectives, may be more prevalent now than at 
times in the past, but I believe that it is not identity politics but other aspects of our culture that 
create in jurors this view of what is expected of them.  Late-twentieth-century cultural productions 
often place creative demands on the reader or viewer, requiring her to impose an order on a chaotic 
stream of images and information.”)  Mauet, surprisingly, appears to miss the inevitability of the 
jury’s story creation.  He believes that lawyers can prevent the jury from engaging in this activity, 
observing that  “[i]f lawyers do not organize the evidence into a clear, simple story, jurors will do so 
on their own.”  Mauet, supra n. 31, at 26. 
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Difficult as it might be for lawyers to hear that the results of the jury room 
narrative tournament are, in part, out of their control, we should not be too 
surprised at Hastie and Pennington’s conclusions.  We know from the list of criteria 
for a viable case theory that “common sense” is a crucial part of the narrative’s 
armament and trial attorneys are familiar with the standard court instruction that 
requires jurors to use their common sense when considering the evidence.66  Hastie 
and Pennington’s model of jury decision making merely confirms that juries take 
this instruction seriously. 
 
The jury-constructed narrative is defined, or “framed,”67 by the jury’s cultural 
experience and is, perhaps, best thought of as the jury’s cultural narrative, the third 
narrative – after the two constructed by the lawyers – to influence the trial’s 
outcome.  Accordingly, in addition to constructing the narrative that explains the 
trial evidence in the best light for their clients, trial lawyers must equip their 
narratives with the ability to engage and co-opt the jury’s cultural narrative.  The 
trial narrative that can best ally itself to the jury’s narrative will doubtless be the 
one to win the duel and return victorious from the jury’s deliberations. 
 
It is in this part of the trial attorney’s work that storytelling techniques can be 
particularly helpful.  As Ruth Anne Robbins has observed, 
 
[b]ecause people respond – instinctively and intuitively – to certain 
recurring story patterns and character archetypes, lawyers should 
systematically and deliberately integrate into their storytelling the 
larger picture of their clients’ goals by subtly portraying their 
individual clients as heroes on a particular life path.  This strategy is 
not merely a device to make the story more interesting, but provides a 
scaffold to influence the judge at the unconscious level by providing a 
metaphor for universal theories of struggle and growth.68 
                                            
66  See, e.g. NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2:320 (Action for Wrongful Death and 
Conscious Pain – Actions Commenced on or after July 26, 2003) (“Taking into account all the factors 
I have discussed, you must use your own common sense and sound judgment based on the evidence 
in determining the amount of the economic loss suffered by [the claimant].”) 
67  Literary theorists use the term “frame” to mean “the cognitive model that is selected and 
used (and sometimes discarded) in the process of reading a narrative text.”  Manfred Jahn,  Frames, 
Preferences, and the Reading of Third-Person Narratives:  Towards a Cognitive Narratology,  18 
Poetics Today 441, 442 (1997).  For a discussion of framing theory applied to the law, see Judith 
Fisher,  Framing Gender:  Federal Appellate Judges’ Choices About Gender-Neutral Language,  43 U. 
S.F. L. Rev. 473 (2009).  Quoting Erving Gottman, Fisher defines frames as “schemata of 
interpretation through which users locate, perceive, identify, and label experience,” and goes on to 
explain that frames are “mental structures, similar to picture frames, which define the perimeters of 
each individual’s unique focus.”  Id. at 484, quoting ERVING GOFFMAN,  FRAME ANALYSIS:  AN ESSAY 
ON ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 21 (1974). 
68  Ruth Anne Robbins,  Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin:  Telling the Client’s Story 
Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypical Hero’s Journey  29 Seattle L. Rev. 767, 768-9 
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The concept of metaphor is crucial here, because it is metaphor – and the other 
rhetorical devices available to practitioners – that allow lawyers to relocate the 
facts of a specific case into the realm of the jury’s cultural narrative.  And the 
selection of metaphors, and the other rhetorical devices lawyers use to persuade 
juries, is an act that must be undertaken with a great deal of empathetic 
sensitivity.  Metaphors act as a translation matrix, allowing square-shaped facts to 
connect to the round hole of cultural narrative, thereby ensuring a snug fit between 
the two worlds.69  In this sense, a lawyer’s challenge is much like that of the ground 
crew during the Apollo 13 flight, devising a way for the command module’s square 
air-scrubbing cartridges to fit into the lunar module’s round air purification system 
in order to process the toxic gasses out of the system, leaving only breathable air.70 
 
 C. Interlude 
 
Well, that didn’t work at all.  I know that as writer and reader, we are engaged in 
an asynchronous dialog,71 but I am confident that whenever in the future you read 
this, your reaction to the end of the previous section was, at its most benign, 
surprise at the analogy I attempted to draw.   
 
The Apollo 13 analogy is intentionally dreadful.  It wrenches the article from a 
discussion of cultural narratives and their role in deciding trials and relocates it 
somewhere in outer space, and it makes reference to an event that, aside from those 
few of you who are devotees of America’s manned space program in the 1960s and 
‘70s (or have a memory of the movie, starring Tom Hanks72), has no context or 
meaning for readers of this piece.    
 
And there lies the lawyering problem at the heart of this article, because the Apollo 
13 analogy is an entirely logical way of describing the role metaphor and rhetoric 
play in the construction of knowledge that happens during jury deliberation, yet it 
was apparently selected with such a disregard of empathy towards my audience 
that it likely failed utterly to persuade you of the point I was apparently trying to 
                                                                                                                                            
(2006).  Robbins is writing here of written storytelling techniques used to influence a court, but the 
principal applies at least as well to the oral narrative of the courtroom.    
69  This gross oversimplification of metaphor’s nature and function will doubtless set many 
rhetoricians’ teeth on edge.  For a helpful and substantially more nuanced discussion of the nature of 
metaphor, see Rideout, supra n. 59, at 160-71. 
70  For a description of this remarkable feat of engineering, see,  ANDREW CHAIKIN,  A MAN ON 
THE MOON, 315-6 (1994). 
71  See, e.g., JOHN R. TRIMBLE,  WRITING WITH STYLE:  CONVERSATIONS ON THE ART OF WRITING, 5 
(2d ed. 2000)(“Far from writing in a vacuum, [the writer] is conversing, in a very real sense, even 
though that person – like you – may be hours, or days, or even years away in time.”) 
72  Apollo 13 (Universal Pictures 1995) (motion picture). 
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make.73  We know that metaphor and other rhetorical devices must be appropriate 
to their audience in order to be effective,74 but if lawyers have difficulty 
empathizing with their audiences the results could be disastrous for their clients.  If 
logical metaphors can backfire so horribly under the controlled conditions of an 
article, the consequences can be even more severe in the courtroom.  The problems 
such a failure of empathy can cause, and the benefits of a well-developed 
empathetic sense, are what we will consider next. 
 
 D. O. J. Simpson, Vioxx, and Max Steur:  Two Failed  
  Trial Strategies and One Success in Trial Tactics 
 
Enough has been written about the O. J. Simpson trial, in both the popular press 
and the scholarly world of law review articles, to contribute, in a modest way, to 
deforestation and global warming.75  Without wishing to make the problem worse, 
the Simpson trial gives us an excellent example of what can happen when non-
empathetic litigators fail to calibrate their trial strategy to the jury’s cultural 
narrative. 
 
                                            
73  For those who do not know the story, here, in a nutshell, is the context that was so woefully 
lacking in the body of the article.  The Apollo 13 mission of April, 1970 came near to disaster after an 
explosion in the spacecraft’s service module caused a loss of power and oxygen to the command 
module, in which the three astronauts were intended to travel during the flight to the moon.  
Chaikin, supra n. 70, at 285-94.  Because of the lack of power in the command module, the crew was 
forced to move to the lunar module, the craft intended to carry two astronauts to the moon’s surface 
and back to the command module.  Id. at 299.  Unfortunately, the presence of three people, instead of 
two, for a substantially longer period than had been planned, threatened to cause the lunar module’s 
carbon dioxide filtering system to overload, which would cause a fatal buildup of carbon dioxide 
before the astronauts could return to earth.  Id. at 315.  The command module had sufficient 
canisters of lithium hydroxide, the substance used to filter carbon dioxide from the air, but these 
canisters were square-shaped, and the lunar module’s environmental control system could only 
accept round-shaped canisters.  Id.  NASA engineers in Houston devised a connecting device that 
would allow the square canisters to fit snugly into the round environmental control system by using 
material available to the astronauts, including tape, socks, and cardboard notebook covers.  Id. at 
320.  The device worked, and the astronauts returned safely to earth. 
74  See, e.g., MICHAEL SMITH,  ADVANCED LEGAL WRITING:  THEORIES  AND STRATEGIES IN 
PERSUASIVE WRITING, 210 (2002)(“Legal writers should also avoid using arcane or esoteric 
metaphoric references.  For a metaphor to be effective, it must be based on well-known concepts 
easily evoked in the mind of the reader.”)  My Apollo 13 reference certainly fails this test.  See also, 
Bruce Ching,  Argument, Analogy, and Audience:  Using Persuasive Comparisons while Avoiding 
Unintended Effects,  7 J ALWD 313, 315-317 (2010)(discussing appropriately effective use of biblical 
imagery in the southeastern United States during the trial of Elvis Presley’s doctor). 
75  This would traditionally be the place to include a list of at least some of the articles and 
books written about the Simpson trial.  To do a creditable job of this, however, would be to clog-up 
this article with a multiple page footnote that would add nothing to its purpose.  In that footnote’s 
place, let me suggest that anyone interested in literature on the trial go to LexisNexis or Westlaw 
and search the legal journals databases for articles with the words “O.J. Simpson” in the title.  They 
will not be disappointed in the volume of reading material. 
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Less has been written about the 2005 Vioxx trial, Ernst v. Merck, in which a 
plaintiff’s verdict for $253 million was vacated by the Texas Court of Appeals.76  
This trial, though, offers another object lesson in a familiar logical, non-empathetic, 
and failed, strategy – that a dry emphasis on the failure of the plaintiffs’ case to 
establish causation, a necessary but technical element in tort liability, would be a 
sufficient defense to a highly emotional case.   
 
Max Steur is mostly forgotten today, although Irving Younger notes that “[m]any 
who knew him and saw him work say that he may have been the greatest [trial] 
lawyer of his generation.”77  Retained by the defendants in the prosecution that 
arose from the Triangle Shirtwaist Fire, Steur’s cross-examination of Kate 
Alterman, a young woman who worked at the Triangle Shirtwaist Company’s 
factory and who was one of the few survivors of that horrific event, is a textbook 
example of tactical empathy employed by a lawyer.  Steur listened to not just the 
logical implications of Alterman’s testimony, but also to how she delivered her 
testimony.  Realizing that her testimony had likely been coached, and needing to 
discredit her without appearing to bully an intensely sympathetic witness, Steuer 
conducted what Younger described as “[p]robably his most celebrated cross-
examination”78 and perhaps one of the finest examples of cross-examination in the 
trial canon. 
 
Taken together, the Simpson and Vioxx cases suggest some fundamental flaws in 
the logical approach to case theory that should cause concern who believe that 
“thinking like a lawyer” is an adequate goal for lawyers who seek to communicate 
with non-lawyers, while the Steur cross-examination points out the importance of a 
less logical, more empathetic, style of practical lawyering. 
 
   
                                            
76  One article that focuses, in part, on this particular Vioxx case is Johansen, supra n. 58, at 77-
81.  That article, in turn, owes much to Roger Parloff,  Stark Choices at the First Vioxx Trial,  
Fortune (July 15, 2005)(available at http://www.sociablemedia.com/PDF/fortune_jul_15_05.pdf).  
Much of the discussion here will be drawn from the Johansen article.  For a discussion of the broader 
Vioxx litigation, see, Frank M. McClellan,  The Vioxx Litigation:  A Critical Look at Trial Tactics, the 
Tort System, and the Roles of Lawyers in Mass Tort Litigation,  57 DePaul L.Rev. 509 (2008).  See 
also,  Michael E. Tigar, The Vioxx Litigation:  Two Case Studies in, Trial Stories (Michael E. Tigar & 
Angela J. Davis, editors) (2008). 
77  Irving Younger, Foreword to Max Steuer’s Cross Examination of Kate Alterman in People v. 
Harris & Blank, 1 (1987). 
78  Id. 
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  1. O. J. Simpson and Domestic Violence 
 
The facts of the Simpson trial79 are sufficiently well-known to only require 
sketching here.  On June 12, 1994, Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman 
were found, stabbed to death, in Brentwood, California.80  Ms. Simpson’s former 
husband, Orenthal James (“O. J.) Simpson was arrested for the murders on June 17 
and subsequently tried. 81  The first day of trial was January 24, 1995,82 the 
prosecution rested its case on July 6,83 and Simpson was found not guilty on 
October 3, 1995.84 
 
The prosecution’s theory rested, in part, on a history of domestic violence between 
Simpson and Ms. Simpson.85  Simpson’s tendency to violence towards Ms. Simpson 
was exacerbated by a series of incidents on June 12, ran the prosecution theory, and 
led directly to her murder and the murder of the man she was with at the time 
Simpson encountered her.86  This was, the prosecution argued, a case in which 
domestic violence had reached its terrible, but logical, conclusion. 
 
The defense offered several alternative theories throughout the trial.87  It floated a 
theory that Ms. Simpson and Goldman were murdered by drug-dealers or their 
associates, either because of mistaken identity or because one or both of the victims 
was involved in “drug-related activities.”88  The defense also proposed a theory to 
explain the prosecution’s extensive scientific evidence that, in essence, relied on the 
Los Angeles Police Department’s incompetence in gathering evidence.89  Most 
                                            
79  There have been enough Simpson trials by this point that I should probably clarify that by 
“the Simpson trial” I mean the criminal trial for the murders of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald 
Goldman. 
80  ROBERT L. SHAPIRO,  THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE:  A DEFENSE ATTORNEY’S BRIEF ON THE O.J. 
SIMPSON CASE, vii (1996). 
81  Id. 
82  Id., at viii  Determining when the trial began is more difficult than it might appear.  Pre-trial 
motions took several months, jury selection began on September 26 and took five weeks to complete, 
and the jury itself was sequestered on January 11.  Id. 
83  Id., at ix. 
84  Id., at x. 
85  Hastie and Pennington, supra n. 63, at 964. 
86  Id. 
87  The defense strategy here was in flagrant violation of one of the central principles of case 
theory development;  that the case theory should be firmly in place well before trial begins.  See, e.g.,  
Mauet, supra n. 31, at 491 (“When discovery is completed, you should have a good grasp of the 
undisputed evidence, where the evidence is in dispute, and what the key factual disputes are.  By 
this time, and before you begin other trial preparation, you must decide on what your theory of the 
case will be, because your trial preparation needs to focus on proving your theory and discrediting 
your opponent’s theory.”)  The “dream team” assembled in Simpson’s defense strayed far from this 
classic, structured, formula, more closely resembling a group of improvising jazz musicians. 
88  Hastie and Pennington, supra. n. 63, at 966 
89  Id., at 967. 
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memorably, the defense also attacked the credibility and motivation of a Los 
Angeles Police Department detective – Mark Fuhrman – who was, asserted the 
defense, a racist officer who reached the decision that Simpson had committed the 
murders and who manufactured evidence to ensure his conviction. 
 
The prosecution’s theory failed utterly with the jury.  The jury only deliberated for 
approximately three hours – after more than eight months of trial – before 
returning with its verdict of not guilty on both murder counts.90  And comments 
made by some jury members after the trial made clear that the prosecution’s 
“domestic abuse” theory was spectacularly unsuccessful.  One juror noted that 
“[t]his was a murder trial, not domestic abuse.  If you want to get tried for domestic 
abuse, go in another courtroom and get tried for that.”91  A second juror stated “I 
could not lay a heavy consideration [on it] as far as that being a motive.  I feel that 
if a person is capable of extreme rage, then those types of things happen a bit more 
often than maybe once every four or five years.”92  A third juror commented that 
“the information [the prosecution] gave us about that period of spousal abuse was 
really not enough information to indicate that this man had built up all this rage 
over all this time.”93  And a fourth juror said  “What they presented to me [about the 
previous domestic violence], well, I related it all to they had been drinking. . . .  But 
I didn’t think it was necessarily a motive for murder.”94 
 
The jury’s verdict was heavily criticized in the aftermath of the Simpson trial.  In 
one survey conducted less than six months after the Simpson verdict, 70% of 
respondents rated Judge Ito’s performance as good or excellent, 79% rated Marcia 
Clark’s performance the same way, 58% rated Johnny Cochran’s performance as 
                                            
90  Id., at 976. 
91  Id., at 971, quoting, Bob Pool & Amy Pyle,  Case was Weak, Race Not a Factor, Two Jurors 
Say,  L.A. Times, Oct. 5, 1995, at A6. 
92  Id., quoting,  ARMANDA COOLEY ET AL.,  MADAM FOREMAN:  A RUSH TO JUDGMENT?, 127 
(1996). 
93  Id,  quoting Cooley, supra, n. 92, at 198. 
94  Id., quoting Cooley, supra n. 92, at 127-8. 
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good or excellent, while only 30% rated the jury’s performance that way.95  Others 
have classified the Simpson verdict as an example of jury nullification.96 
 
Jury nullification is, of course, the ultimate triumph of “feeling” over “thinking,”97 
which is perhaps why it so anathematic to many lawyers.98  Certainly the notion of 
jury nullification – of a jury ignoring the hermetic world of admissible evidence and 
controlled discourse in a trial and instead allowing themselves to be influenced by 
                                            
95  Gerald F. Uelmen,  Jury-Bashing and the O.J. Simpson Verdict  20 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 
475, 475 (1997), quoting A Survey of the Citrus Municipal Court District  (“Citrus Court Survey”) 
(Nat’l Demographics Corp., Claremont, California), January 18-19, 1996, at tbls. 2—4, 6.  The 
judgment of a group, 79% of whom felt the losing prosecutor did a good job and only 58% of whom felt 
the prevailing defense attorney did a good job, might legitimately be called into question.  And the 
inherent conservatism of the group was revealed by other answers in the survey:  55% identified 
themselves as Republican, 59% described themselves as “conservative,” and 15% as “very 
conservative,” and when asked whether California “should make convicted criminals do manual 
labor in chain-gangs, 74% expressed agreement.”  Id., at 475, quoting Citrus Court Survey, at tbls. 
53-54, 34. 
96  See, e.g.:  Andrew G.T. Moore II,  The O.J. Simpson Trial – Triumph of Justice or Debacle?,  
41 St. Louis U. L.J. 9, 20 (1996)(“By insinuating a racist police plot to frame O.J. Simpson, the 
defense had all the ammunition it needed for an act of nullification)(citation omitted);  Bryan 
Morgan,  The Jury’s View,  67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 983, 983 (1996)(“. . . I am drawn to the unpleasant 
conclusion that racial bias – the controlling influence of race on one’s actions – was the principal, and 
probably the dispositive, reason for the Simpson acquittal);  W. William Hodes,  Lord Brougham, The 
Dram Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind,  67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1075, 1079 (1996)(In the 
Simpson trial, “the defense lawyers were able to induce even the jurors who harbored no doubts – 
and certainly no reasonable doubts – about whether O.J. Simpson actually ‘did it,’ to vote for 
acquittal anyway, as a matter of long-term justice”).  Others disagree.  See, e.g.:  Hastie and 
Pennington, supra n. 63, at 976 (“We see on clear indication that the jury deliberately nullified the 
law and disregarded its fact-finding task to send a message to majority white America or to the 
LAPD.”)(citation omitted);  Uelmen, supra n. 95, at 478 (“. . .  the verdict . . . was not jury 
nullification.”  Uelman was a member of the Simpson defense team, and his opinion should be read 
in that context);  Justice Rebecca Love Kourlis,  Not Jury Nullification;  Not a Call for Ethical 
Reform;  But Rather a Case for Judicial Control,  67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1109, 1117 (1996)(“Because 
Cochran’s main arguments were based on assessing the credibility and reliability of the evidence, I 
do not believe Cochran stepped over the bounds of ethics to argue jury nullification.”) 
97  To reprise, the difference between those identified as “thinkers” and as ‘”feelers” is not based 
on the ultimate decision the individual might take, but rather on “the justifications, bases, or 
reasons one articulates for one’s decisions.”  Daicoff, supra, n. 27, at 113.  As an example of the 
distinction between the two states, Daicoff quotes two questions designed to locate a responder on 
the thinking/feeling continuum:  “[One] sample question is:  ‘Is it better to be (a) just; or (b) merciful? 
. . .  Another is:  “In a heated discussion, do you:  (a) stick to your guns;  or (b) look for common 
ground?’  . . .  In each of these, (a) is a [t]hinking response, while (b) is a [f]eeling response.””  Id. at 
114.  With this distinction in mind, one can see that nullifiers will tend to the “feeling” end of this 
continuum and those inclined to follow the evidence and instructions will tend to the “thinking” end. 
98  See, e.g.,  Kourlis, supra n. 96, at 1109 (“. . . I find jury nullification akin to anarchy.  Under 
its auspices, twelve people become self-appointed legislators, changing the law to fit the 
circumstances of a particular crime or a particular political climate.  It is intolerable in an ordered 
society.”) 
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their general sense of what the “proper” result should be99 – would be almost 
inconceivable to a law student, who has spent the first year of legal study being told 
to shut out all outside influences and make evaluations and decisions solely on the 
basis of legal doctrine.  Yet the existence of such a concept stands as a powerful 
symbol for the proposition that lawyers and non-lawyers can, and frequently do, 
think very differently about the same set of facts. 
 
The Simpson trial was so extensive and excessive that it can stand as an example of 
almost anything anyone wants to prove.  For our purposes, it serves as an example 
of a fundamental misjudgment of a jury by a group of prosecutors;  a failure of 
empathy by prosecutors who did not understand the jury to whom they were 
arguing.  As Hastie and Pennington note in their brief review of the trial, the 
prosecution “sought to present a single, linear story.”100  The prosecution’s fatal 
error was in selecting when to begin that story.  By delving back into Simpson’s 
relationship with his ex-wife, and by attempting to define the nature of that 
relationship, between an African-American man and a White woman, as one of 
domestic violence – with the murders as the logical conclusion of that violence – the 
prosecution tied itself to a complicated narrative that was replete with cultural, 
gender, and racial overtones.101 
 
At least one report of the prosecution’s reasons for selecting the story they told to 
the jury describes the lead prosecutor, Marcia Clark, as saying  
 
she preferred to have black women over black men on the jury, because 
culturally it is known that domestic abuse is more prevalent in black 
households than in white families.  Her thinking was that black 
women were becoming more liberated, were fed up with being beaten, 
                                            
99  An example of a juror’s unwillingness to act as an unthinking balancer of carefully selected 
evidence can be found in Marianne Wesson’s description of the Public Broadcasting System’s 
documentary, Inside the Jury, in which “one juror suggests that really the evidence and the court’s 
instructions leave no room for an outcome other than guilty [and] another actually growls ‘I am not a 
computer.’”  Wesson,  supra n. 65, at 952,  quoting, Inside the Jury Room (PBS television broadcast, 
1986). 
100  Hastie and Pennington, supra n. 63, at 964. 
101  An abbreviated list of articles that center on the issues flowing from the prosecution’s 
domestic violence story includes:  Devon W. Carbado,  The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial 
Victim,  32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 49 (1997);  Myrna S. Raeder,  The Double-Edged Sword:  
Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome By and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic 
Violence,  67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 789 (1996);  Myrna S. Raeder,  The Admissibility of Prior Acts of 
Domestic Violence: . . .  Simpson and Beyond,  69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1463 (1996);  Nancy S. Ehrenreich,  
O.J. Simpson & the Myth of Gender/Race Conflict,  67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 931 (1996);  Cheryl I. Harris,  
Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and Susan Smith – Spectacles of Our Times,  
35 Washburn L.J. 225 (1996);  Leonard M. Baynes,  A Time to Kill, The O.J. Simpson Trials, and 
Storytelling to Juries,  17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 549, 563 (1997);  Sheri L. Burr,  O.J. As a Tale of 2 
Operas,  68 UMKC L. Rev. 705 (2000). 
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would identify with Nicole, and would be angry with Simpson for 
having brutalized her.102 
 
These opinions, reportedly expressed in conversations between Ms. Clark and Dr. 
Donald Vinson of DecisionQuest, a jury consulting firm that advised the Simpson 
prosecution team briefly during jury selection,103 were contradicted by polls 
conducted by DecisionQuest, which indicated that “while 23 percent of black males 
thought Simpson was guilty, only 7 percent of black women thought so.104  In 
additional research conducted by DecisionQuest, African-American women 
indicated that the reports of Simpson’s domestic violence were “simply not a big 
deal.”105  These results were apparently consistent with the research conducted by 
the defense’s jury consultant.106 
 
It is always easy, of course, to criticize a decision after its results are known.  And 
there were enough other moments in the trial that might have led any jury to 
conclude that the prosecution had failed to prove Simpson’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt that it is impossible to say, with certainty, that Clark’s mis-
reading of the jury’s response to the domestic abuse evidence on which the 
prosecution relied, or her unwillingness to consider the jury consultant’s 
suggestions that a jury composed as was the Simpson jury would be unlikely to 
convict based on a domestic violence theory, was the cause of Simpson’s acquittal.107  
What seems certain, though, is that Clark made what other lawyers might consider 
to be a logical rather than an empathetic assumption – that women, who are likely 
to be the victims of domestic violence,108 would be offended by the evidence showing 
Simpson to be an abuser and would draw from that evidence the logical conclusion 
that Simpson had progressed from abuser to murderer – and that this assumption 
                                            
102  VINCENT BUGLIOSI,  OUTRAGE:  THE FIVE REASONS WHY O.J. SIMPSON GOT AWAY WITH 
MURDER , 94 (1996).  
103  DecisionQuest prepared graphics and courtroom displays for the prosecution throughout the 
trial, but only participated in two days of the jury selection process.  Id., at 93-4. 
104  Id., at 95. 
105  Id.  Respondents apparently also indicated that “[i]n every relationship, there’s a little 
trouble;”  “[p]eople get slapped around.  That just happens;”  and “[i]t doesn’t mean he killed her.”  
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE RUN OF HIS LIFE:  THE PEOPLE V. O. J. SIMPSON, at 191 (1997). 
106  Stephanie Leonard Yarbrough,  The Jury Consultant – Friend or Foe of Justice,  54 SMU L. 
Rev. 1885, 1892 (2001)(noting that the expert, Jo-Ellen Dimitrius, concluded that ‘African-American 
women over thirty years old ‘would not necessarily believe spousal abuse leads to murder’”), quoting 
Adrienne Drell, Complex Decisions, Chi. Sun-Times, May 24, 2000, at 6. 
107  To make such an assertion would also be to ignore or to downplay the sometimes excellent 
work done by Simpson’s defense attorneys, particularly the work of Barry Sheck and Peter Neufeld. 
108  Clark’s more specific belief that African-American women are more likely to be the victims of 
domestic violence than white women appears to have been based on prejudice, not empirical 
evidence. 
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was entirely incorrect.  Clark thought like a lawyer, and as a result, failed 
accurately to gauge the jury’s response to the evidence.109 
 
   2. Vioxx and a Failure to Show Causation 
 
The lawyers representing Merck Pharmaceuticals (“Merck”) made a similar error 
during the Ernst trial.110  At issue in the case was whether Vioxx, a pain reliever 
produced by Merck, had caused Bob Ernst to suffer a fatal heart attack.111  Vioxx 
was approved for marketing in 2000 and quickly developed a significant share of the 
painkiller market.112  Concerns over Vioxx’s possible connection to heart illness 
grew over the time it was on the market, prompting one law firm to have filed over 
300 lawsuits even before the drug was withdrawn after studies demonstrated a link 
between it and a significant increase in the risk of heart attacks.113  The specific 
danger posed by Vioxx was an increased risk of blood clots which could lead to 
sudden heart attacks.114 
 
Bob Ernst was an apparently healthy and active 59 year old man who took Vioxx for 
arthritis pain in his hands.115  Some months after beginning a Vioxx regimen, Mr. 
Ernst died after suffering a heart attack.116  Mr. Ernst’s autopsy revealed that he 
had suffered from hardening of the arteries, and that his heart attack had been 
caused by arrhythmia.117 
 
The strategies for both sides in the litigation were easy to predict.  W. Mark Lanier, 
the plaintiff’s lawyer  
 
developed characters:  the innocent Ernst, struck down in the prime of 
life;  and the money-grubbing Merck, more concerned with profit than 
safety.  On the other hand, [Merck’s lawyer, David C. Kiernan,] 
presented scientific evidence showing the link between Vioxx was no 
greater than similar links between heart attacks and other drugs, 
including ibuprofen.  He showed that Ernst died from arrhythmia – 
                                            
109  For a more detailed analysis of the Simpson litigation by an experienced criminal defense 
attorney, see Angela J. Davis,  The People v. Orenthal James Simpson:  Race and Trial Advocacy in 
Trial Stories, supra n. 76, at 283-352. 
110  Ernst v. Merck,  2008 WL 2201769 (2008), rev’d  296 S.W. 3d 81 (Tex. App. 2009). 
111  Johansen, supra n. 58, at 77-8. 
112  McClellan, supra n. 76, at 514.  Vioxx accomplished sales of $2.5 billion in the four years – 
from 2000 until September, 2004 – in which it was marketed worldwide.  Id.   
113  Id. 
114  Johansen, supra n. 58, at 78. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. 
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and that taking Vioxx presented no known increased risk of 
arrhythmia.118 
 
In short, the plaintiff’s lawyer put the drug on trial for causing “heart attacks,” and 
Merck on trial for being a “profit-driven giant corporation whose pursuit of profits 
ultimately killed [Mr. Ernst],” who had died of a heart attack after taking Vioxx.119  
Merck defended by seeking to prove that while Vioxx might have caused “heart 
attacks,” it didn’t cause Mr. Ernst’s heart attack, relying on technical terms like 
“’NSAIDS’ and ‘coxibs’ and ‘cardiothromboembolic’ events [and] on corporate 
documents full of similar medical jargon.”120 
 
Viewed logically, and based on the law, Merck appeared to have by far the stronger 
case.  Causation, as any first year law student knows after studying torts, is a 
crucial element in any personal injury claim.121  Yet in the Ernst case, the only 
evidence the plaintiff could offer to support causation was the testimony of Dr. 
Maria Araneta the medical examiner who had conducted the autopsy.122    Dr. 
Araneta testified that while she had found no blood clot (a crucial finding because, 
as both parties agreed, blood clots that led to myocardial infarctions were the only 
risk posed by Vioxx) during her autopsy, “it was possible that Ernst died of a blood 
clot that was dissipated during CPR.”123  With this as the only evidence offered to 
establish causation, it seems likely that a substantial majority of law students 
confronted with the facts of the Ernst litigation would conclude that it was an easy 
hypothetical:  the defendant would prevail. 
 
In fact, however, the jury awarded the plaintiff $253 million, “including $229 
million in punitive damages.”124  When the case was later considered by a panel of 
judges, however, the court vacated the jury’s award and entered a defense 
verdict.125  The court dismissed the ‘dissipated blood clot’ possibility offered by Dr. 
Araneta as “mere ‘speculation’” and concluded, as we might expect from a group of 
lawyers, that there was no evidence of causation, and therefore no liability.126 
                                            
118  Id., at 78-9.  For portions of Lanier’s opening statement to the jury, see Michel E. Tigar, The 
Vioxx Litigation, supra n. 76, at 404-407. 
119  Johansen, supra n. 58, at 78. 
120  Id., at 79.  For portions of Kiernan’s opening statement to the jury, see, Tigar, supra n. 88, at 
408-09. 
121  For a discussion of the role of causation in fact in a torts case see, e.g., PROSSER, WADE, & 
SCHWARTZ,  TORTS:  CASES AND MATERIALS, 268-303 (Victor E. Schwartz, Kathryn Kelly, & David F. 
Partlett, editors) (2010). 
122  Johansen, supra n. 58, at 79. 
123  Id. 
124  Id..  Texas’s cap on non-economic damages operated to reduce the punitive damages award 
and the trial court ultimately awarded Mr. Ernst’s survivor $26.1 million.  Id., citing Merck,  296 
S.W.3d at 81. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
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In his analysis of the conflicting trial strategies, Johansen concluded that while the 
plaintiff’s attorney was “weaving a compelling story,” the defense attorney “failed to 
develop the story of his client.”127  Johansen dismissed the possibility that the 
plaintiff’s “two-pronged emotional appeal – an innocent person died, and a greedy 
drug company ignored potential safety concerns to make greater profits”128 had 
caused the jury to overlook the problems with the evidence establishing causation, 
noting that the adversarial system allowed the defense to counter the plaintiff’s 
narrative, and concluded that the Ernst jury verdict was a triumph of more effective 
storytelling.129 
 
As in the Simpson case, one cannot know for certain to what extent the defense 
strategy caused Merck to lose the Ernst trial.130  Certainly, the Vioxx litigation was 
not a guaranteed loser for the defense;  Merck finally settled the Vioxx litigation 
after contesting fourteen trials, resulting in five plaintiffs verdicts and nine verdicts 
in favor of the defense.131  Whether those defense verdicts were obtained as a result 
of different geographical or other, non-evidentiary, reasons, or were the result of 
different facts, or of different strategies, is not, and cannot be, known.132   
                                            
127  Johansen, supra n. 58, at 79. 
128  Id. at 80. 
129  Id. at 80-81.  Johansen also observed that “the existing ethical limits of litigation provide 
significant safeguards against the potentially overreaching power of story.”  Id. at 81. 
130  Nor is it possible to tell whether or not the Ernst jury’s verdict was caused by nullification or 
not.  Some scholars argue that there is no such thing as civil jury nullification.  See, e.g., Anne 
Bowen Poulin,  The Jury:  The Criminal Justice System’s Different Voice,  62 U. Cin. L.Rev. 1377, 
1386 (1994)(“[N]ullification is not an aspect of civil litigation”).  Others, though, believe that civil 
juries have nullificatory powers.  See, e.g.,  Lars Noah,  Civil Jury Nullification,  86 Iowa L.Rev. 
1601, 1603 (2001)(the concept that civil juries cannot nullify “is unduly narrow”).  Noah notes that in 
litigation involving the drug Bendectin, and also in the silicone-gel breast implant litigation, “juries 
returned verdicts for the plaintiffs even after deciding that the evidence failed to demonstrate that 
these products could have caused the plaintiffs’ afflictions.”  Id., at 1605.  Certainly the fact that the 
jury found Merck liable for Mr. Ernst’s death when the only evidence regarding causation was 
speculative at best seems to suggest that it placed less emphasis on the law’s causation requirement 
than might have been expected. 
131  McClellan, supra n. 76, at 510. 
132  That alternative strategies were available to Merck, however, is certain.  See, e.g., Johansen, 
supra n. 58, at 80 (discussing a suggested alternative narrative that could have been developed in 
defense of Merck and its actions in regards to Vioxx, proposed by a member of the Vioxx defense 
team).  See also, Tigar, supra n. 76, at 410 (providing excerpts of the opening statement by a lawyer 
representing Merck in a different case showing that alternative explanations for plaintiff’s death 
existed:  “Thank you, your honor.  [Plaintiff’s counsel] talked for about 60 minutes.  While he was 
talking, about 60 people across the United States died from exactly the same thing that caused Mr. 
Irvin’s death and not a single one of them was taking Vioxx.  I’m going to talk for about 60 minutes 
and while I’m talking another 60 people across the United States will die of the same thing that 
caused Mr. Irvin’s death, and not a single one of them is taking Vioxx.  The reason is that the thing 
that caused Mr. Irvin’s death is the leading cause of death in the United States of America.  That 
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We can, though, acknowledge that the defense strategy in Ernst, like Clark’s 
domestic violence strategy in the Simpson case, was a logical, rational strategy, 
based on the facts of the case and that both represent a failure of empathy, in that 
neither strategy spoke to the jury’s cultural narrative of Merck as a representative 
of “big pharma,” whereas the strategies employed by opposing counsel in both 
Simpson and Ernst were directed specifically at the jury’s narrative.  And while two 
cases, plucked from the millions of civil and criminal trials tried over the years, 
cannot stand definitively for anything, the failure of the “logical” strategy in both 
cases at least suggests the possibility that the rational, logical approach 
characterized by the concept of “thinking like a lawyer” might not always be the 
most effective way to communicate with those who have not been trained to think 
the same way.  Perhaps what is needed from lawyers is a more empathetic response 
to both the facts and those being asked to consider and rule on them. 
 
  3. The Triangle Shirtwaist Trial 
   and The Tactical Use of Empathy 
 
Although trial lawyers must develop strong strategic skills that allow them to map 
out case narratives that will engage and persuade juries, they must also develop a 
strong tactical sense that will allow them to understand the nuances of testimony as 
it comes in during a trial, and must be able to understand how to exploit any 
possible advantages to their clients offered by such nuances.  An empathetic 
response is just as important in this tactical stage as it is when developing the 
strategy for the overall trial. 
 
Max Steuer, counsel for the defendants in the Triangle Shirtwaist fire prosecution, 
gives us a flawless example of situational, or tactical, empathy, both in his 
immediate understanding of the possible advantages offered to his case by the 
prosecution’s star witness and in his sensitive handling of the witness to achieve the 
best result for his clients. 
 
The facts of the tragic Triangle Shirtwaist fire case are easily given.  The Triangle 
Waist Company was the largest manufacturer of women’s blouses in New York 
City.133  The company occupied three floors of the Asch Building, located near 
Washington Place.134  On Saturday, March 25, 1911, at the end of the workday,135 a 
                                                                                                                                            
was true before Vioxx ever came on the market, and that’s true today after Vioxx is no longer being 
sold.”) 
133  David von Drehle,  Triangle:  The Fire that Changed America (2003). 
134  Id. at 46-7. 
135  Saturday was the short day in the six-day work week at the Triangle Waist Company.  Id. at 
105.  Work began at 9 am and ended at 4:45 pm.  Id. 
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fire broke out on the cutting room floor.136  The fire spread quickly, and one hundred 
forty-six people were killed, many of whom – in a scene familiar to anyone who 
witnessed the September 11, 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center buildings 
– died while jumping from the building to escape the flames.137 
 
The furor that resulted from the tragedy led to criminal prosecutions of the owners 
of the Triangle Waist Company, Isaac Harris and Max Blank, for misdemeanor 
manslaughter.138  The prosecution’s theory was that the defendants had caused one 
of the loft exit doors to be locked, thereby preventing at least some of the victims 
from escaping the fire.139  Accordingly, it was crucial for the prosecution to be able 
to establish that at least one victim of the fire had died as a direct result of the door 
being locked.140  The prosecutor’s found one such victim – Margaret Schwartz – and 
found a witness – Kate Alterman – who could testify that Schwartz had died 
because the door was locked.141 
 
Little is known of Kate Alterman with certainty.  She appears to have been the 
daughter of Morris Alterman who emigrated from Russia to Philadelphia in 1903,142 
and testified in strongly-accented English.143  How she found herself to be working 
at the Triangle Waist Company on March 25, 1911 is unknown, but that she was 
there was beyond doubt to anyone who heard her testimony. 
 
The simplest way to understand what the jurors, and Max Steuer, heard from Kate 
Alterman is to reproduce verbatim a portion of her direct examination. 
 
Q. Margaret Swartz [sic.] was with you at this time? 
 
A. At this time, yes sir. 
 
Q. Then where did you go? 
 
A. Then I went to the toilet room, Margaret disappeared from me, 
and I wanted to go up Greene Street side, but the whole door was in 
flames, so I went and hide myself in the toilet rooms, and then I went 
out right away from the toilet rooms and bent my face over the sink, 
and then I ran to the Washington side elevator, but there was a big 
                                            
136  Id., at 117. 
137  Id., at 167. 
138  Younger, supra n. 77, at 1. 
139  Id.  In fact, as Younger notes, “most of the victims would have died whether or not the exit 
door was locked.”  Id.   
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Von Drehle, supra n. 133, at 242. 
143  Id. 
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crowd and I couldn’t pass through there.  Then I noticed some one 
[sic.], a whole crowd, around the door, and I saw Bernstein, the 
manager’s brother trying to open the door, and there was Margaret 
near him.  Bernstein tried the door, he couldn’t open it, and then 
Margaret began to open that door.  I take her on one side – I pushed 
her on the side and I said, “Wait, I will open that door.”  I tried, I 
pulled the handle in and out, all ways, and  I couldn’t open it.  She 
pushed me on the other side, got hold of the handle and then she tried.  
And then I saw her bending down on her knees, and her hair was 
loose, and the trail of her dress was a little far from her, and then a big 
smoke came, and I couldn’t see, I just know it was Margaret, and I said 
“Margaret,” and she didn’t reply.  I left Margaret, I turned my head on 
the side, and I noticed the trail of her dress and the ends of her hair 
begin to burn.  Then I ran in, in a small dressing room that was on the 
Washington side, there was a big crowd and I went out from there, 
stood in the center of the room between the machines and between the 
examining tables.  I noticed afterwards on the other side, near the 
Washington side windows, Bernstein, the manager’s brother throwing 
around like a wild cat on the windows, and he was chasing his head 
out of the window, and pull himself back – he wanted to jump, I 
suppose, but he was afraid.  And then I saw the flames cover him.  I 
noticed on the Greene Street side some one else fall down on the  floor 
and the flames cover him.  And then I stood in the center of the room, 
and I just turned my coat on the left side with the fur to my face, the 
lining on the outside, got hold of a bunch of dresses that was lying on 
the examining table not burned yet, covered up my head and I tried to 
run through the flames to the Greene Street side.  The whole door was 
a red curtain of flame, but a young lady came and she began to pull me 
in the back of my dress and she wouldn’t let me in.  I kicked her with 
my foot and I don’t know what became of her, and I ran out through 
the Greene Street side door, right through the flames, on to the roof. 
 
Q. When you were standing toward the middle of the floor had you 
your pocketbook with you? 
 
A. Yes sir, my pocketbook began to burn already, but I pressed it to 
my heart to extinguish the fire.144 
 
This is extraordinarily powerful testimony, even when printed on paper and read 
almost one hundred years after the event.  Alterman’s vivid description of the 
Triangle Shirtwaist fire, told by someone so close to death herself as she literally 
                                            
144  Max Steuer’s Cross Examination of Kate Alterman in People v. Harris & Blank (“Cross 
Examination”), 2-3 (1987).  
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kicked and fought her way to safety, certainly had a dramatic impact on the jury of 
twelve men who were trying the case.  Max Steur is reported as saying  
 
I cannot describe to you . . . the pathetic picture made by that little 
girl.  I cannot reproduce the tears that were running down her cheeks, 
nor can I tell you how the eyes of the twelve jurors were riveted on her 
and how they sat craning forward, thrilled by the girl’s story and how 
they wept when she told it.145 
 
Alterman’s testimony had conveyed in the most compelling way possible some 
crucial aspects of the prosecution’s case:  Schwartz had attempted to escape through 
the ninth floor Washington Place door;  the door was locked;146  and Schwartz had 
died.  In short, Kate Alterman’s testimony was devastating to the defense. 
 
And yet there were aspects to Alterman’s testimony that sounded strange, to Steuer 
at least.  She used turns of phrase – “throwing around like a wild cat,”  and “red 
curtain of fire” – that sounded at odds with her normal mode of speech, the detail of 
pressing her pocketbook to her “heart to extinguish the fire” sounded more 
melodramatic than necessary, and the word “extinguish” sounded more like a 
lawyer than a teenage immigrant.”147 
 
Steuer began his cross examination by a series of questions that established with 
whom Alterman had been in contact since the fire and then – breaking all the 
logical  rules against having a witness repeat damaging testimony – he said:  “Now, 
I want you to tell me your story over again, just as you told it before.”148  And 
Alterman went back through her description of the fire, using again phrases like 
“Bernstein, the manager’s brother,”149 “he wanted to jump, I suppose, but he was 
afraid,”150 “I pressed it to my heart to extinguish the fire,”151 and “a red curtain of 
fire.152  Steuer pointed out that she had left out the description of Bernstein 
jumping around “like a wildcat,” and Alterman reaffirmed that he was “[l]ike a 
wildcat.”153 
 
                                            
145  Von Drehle, supra n. 133, at 245. 
146  To put an exclamation point around that point, the prosecutor later asked Kate Alterman 
what Ms. Schwartz did as she tried to open the door.  “She screamed at the top of her voice, “My God, 
I am lost!  The door is locked!  Open the door!”  Cross Examination, supra n. 144,  at 3. 
147  Von Drehle, supra n. 133, at 245. 
148  Cross Examination, supra n. 144, at 7. 
149  Id. at 7, 8 
150  Id., at 8. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. 
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Then, after a few more questions that helped to locate where Alterman had been 
when the fire started, Steuer asked her to tell her story yet again.154  And again, she 
used phrases like “Bernstein, the manager’s brother,”155 “he wanted to jump, I 
suppose, but he was afraid,”156 “I pressed it to my heart to extinguish the fire,”157 “a 
red curtain of fire,”158 and that Bernstein “jumped like a wildcat on the walls.”159 
 
The trial then broke for lunch, and when Steuer’s cross examination resumed, he 
got Alterman to deny that she had discussed her testimony with anyone before she 
gave it, and then asked her to tell her story for a fourth time.  And again, she used 
phrases like “Bernstein’s brother,”160 “he wanted to jump out from the window, I 
suppose, but he was afraid,”161 and “a red curtain of fire,”162 and indicated again 
that Bernstein was “throwing around like a wildcat.”163 
 
On re-cross, Steuer got Alterman to affirm that she had not prepared her testimony 
and asked her if she could tell her story in any words or in the words she used when 
she gave her written statement.164  Although she testified that she could, she left 
the witness stand without offering a differently-phrased account of the fire.  During 
his closing argument, Steuer “quietly pointed out to the jury that Kate Alterman’s 
high flown language could not have been her own.  She was not testifying to an 
honest recollection, but to a doctored version of the events of March 25, 1911, a 
version which had been prepared by another and committed by Kate to memory.”165  
The jury acquitted both defendants. 
 
Steuer’s genius is evident in his two key responses to Alterman’s testimony.  First, 
Steuer recognized that the testimony was probably coached, because of the 
predominance of vocabulary and phraseology inconstant with who Alterman was.  
And second, Steuer recognized the power and likely factual accuracy of the 
testimony166 and that he could not undertake a destructive, bullying, cross-
                                            
154  Id., at 10. 
155  Id., at 10, 11. 
156  Id., at 11. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. 
159  Id. 
160  Id., at 12.  This time through her description of events, Alterman omitted that Bernstein was 
the manager’s brother. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. 
163  Id. 
164  Id., at 13-15. 
165  Younger, supra n. 77, at 2. 
166  Ms. Schwartz’s body was found within feet of where Alterman testified she had last seen her 
and Bernstein, the manager’s brother, died in the fire as well.  As von Drehle notes, it is “entirely 
believable” that he should have behaved in the manner Alterman described, and that he was, indeed, 
afraid of jumping from the window to his certain death below.  Von Drehle, supra n. 133, at 250. 
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examination of such a sympathetic witness.  Instead, he realized – apparently as 
the direct examination was proceeding – that his only hope of deflecting the harm 
from Alterman’s testimony was to show the jury how coached it was.   
 
Neither of these responses was “logical:” in all material, evidentiary terms, the 
testimony was both truthful and devastating, and in presenting it, the prosecution 
had every reason to believe that it would bring about a conviction of both 
defendants.  Instead, Steuer’s responses to Alterman’s testimony were 
quintessentially empathetic, in that they set logic aside and dealt, instead, with a 
deep personal understanding of what Alterman’s words meant and how to counter 
their effect on the jury. 
 
It is this empathetic response, and its importance for lawyers at both the strategic 
and tactical level, that we will next consider. 
 
  E. The Need For Empathetic Lawyering 
 
The examples outlined above show the failures that can occur when empathy is 
lacking, and suggest that a more empathetic response to both witness and jury can 
produce more effective lawyering strategy and tactics, and ultimately a more 
satisfactory result for the client.  In the narrow context of the dictionary’s definition 
of the term, then, empathy forms, or should form, a crucial part of a lawyer’s 
arsenal although, as Nussbaum cautions, empathy alone can be dangerous, and 
should be used “only in combination with a directive ethical intelligence that 
animates the whole of the text, and allows us to see the world in a way that permits 
human understanding, and the understanding of the people as human.”167  
  
Nussbaum’s caveat is significant because legal education – at least the education 
provided to most students in the first year of law school – can be viewed as a 
systematic attempt to eliminate that directive ethical and empathetic intelligence 
and replace it with an ethical, but entirely logical, intelligence that prohibits human 
understanding.  It is this elimination of ethical intelligence that so concerned the 
authors of the Carnegie Report when they wrote that law schools seek to “flip off the 
switch of ethical and human concern, teach legal analysis, and later, when students 
have mastered the central intellectual skill of thinking like a lawyer, flip the switch 
back on.”168   
 
Anecdotal evidence, at least, suggests that the students understand that the legal 
education process changes them.  Responding to a survey conducted by Lani 
Guinier at the University of Pennsylvania, one student noted that “I changed so 
much.  I used to be a much more compassionate person, much more tolerant of 
                                            
167  Nussbaum, supra n. 9, at 329. 
168  Carnegie Report, supra n. 17, at 141. 
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different choices, in terms of lifestyle, in terms of personality.  I just feel like law 
school has put huge blinders on my eyes.”169  And another student participating in 
the Guinier study responded that  
 
I feel that [compassion] is something that is eradicated in law school.  
This notion that we can present things as though, like the law, it’s a 
self-contained unit, it’s a sphere that we can look down upon as though 
we were astronauts that can look down upon the earth.  The whole 
idea that these things are neutral and that a neutral outcome results 
just eliminates any notion of compassion because professors sort of 
play on that.  ‘Oh  you feel sorry for those people.  Oh well that’s too 
bad.  Oh, well the law says X.’  We really are taught that compassion is 
a bad thing.170 
 
Guinier argues that because law schools are institutions whose role is, in large part, 
to produce students who are ready to participate in a competitive legal employment 
market,171 they are places that “valorize[] sorting, [and that] reward[] people who 
think fast but not always those who think deeply.”172  She continues that  
 
the way things are done in law school (the Socratic method, timed 
issue-spotting exams, large classrooms, unpatrolled and informal 
networks) devalues and distorts those characteristics associated with 
women, such as empathy, relational logic, and nonaggressive behavior.  
In this understanding, law school unintentionally uses a male-oriented 
baseline to measure male/female differences, rendering women as less 
than competent.173 
 
                                            
169  Anonymous third year woman law student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
quoted in LANI GUINIER, ET AL,  BECOMING GENTLEMEN:  WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE (“Guinier”), 35 (1997). 
170  Id.,  at 52 (quoting an anonymous third year woman law student at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School). 
171  Guinier is not alone in this belief.  See, e.g.,  Alex M. Johnson, Jr.,  Think Like a Lawyer, 
Work Like a Machine:  The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice,  64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
1231, 1246 (1990-91)(“[F]irms prize law students not for what they have learned about law but 
rather for the intelligence and potential that law schools rewarded by admitting them.  We at elite 
law schools serve as gatekeepers to the legal profession through our decisions regarding whom to 
admit.  Because a law school admitted ‘Recruit X,’ who went to an undergraduate school without a 
national reputation and who took courses about which a law firm knows little and cares even less, 
the law school has put to rest the firm’s anxieties about ‘Recruit X’’s intelligence and adaptability.”)   
172  Guinier, supra n. 169, at 2. 
173  Id., at 66-67. 
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In order to succeed, Guinier concludes, at least some women become bi-cultural by 
“learn[ing] to function as ‘social males’ and on some level they . . . become 
‘gentlemen.’”174 
 
Whether or not one accepts Guinier’s feminist critique of the law school process, or 
her perception that empathy is a characteristic uniquely associated with women, 
there can be little argument that law school is a particularly transformative 
experience for those who come with well-developed senses of empathy.  Aside from 
the personal harm such a transformation can cause,175 it can also cause professional 
harm, particularly where, as in the Simpson and Vioxx cases, lawyers make poor 
decisions as a result of their failure to calibrate their trial strategies to the actual, 
as opposed to logical, responses of the non-lawyer juries who evaluate and decide on 
those strategies during their deliberations. 
 
The lawyers in these cases had alternatives.  In his review of Merck’s litigation 
strategy in the Ernst case, for example, Professor Johansen describes a potential 
alternative trial narrative proposed by another member of the Vioxx defense team: 
 
This verdict is bad news for all of us, and some of us will die 
prematurely because the lawsuit deterred the research and 
development of life-saving drugs. 
 
And Vioxx was one such life-saving drug.  The painkillers that it 
replaced (and is now replaced by) cause their own health problems, 
and current medical thinking is that, at least for some people, Vioxx 
would be a safer as well as a more effective pain-killer than aspirin, 
despite what we now know to be the latter’s better cardioprotective 
profile.  But Merck can’t collect $26 million from each person whose life 
they save, even it were possible to point to a particular Alvy Singer of 
                                            
174  Id., at 68. 
175  There is little question that the law school experience causes many students to suffer 
psychological harm.  See, e.g.,  Daicoff, Lawyer, Be Thyself, supra n. 27, at 96;  Nancy Soonpa,  Stress 
in Law Students:  A Comparative Study of First-Year, Second-Year, and Third-Year Students,  36 U. 
Conn. L. Rev.  355 (2003-04);  Ruth Ann McKinney,  Depression and Anxiety in Law Students:  Are 
We Part of the Problem and Can We Be Part of the Solution?  8 J. Legal Writing Inst.. 229 (2002);  
Suzanne C. Segerstrom,  Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law School,  32 
Willamette L. Rev. 593 (1996);  B.A. Glesner,  Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools,  23 Conn. L. 
Rev. 627, 650-53 (1991);  Andrew H. Benjamin et al,  The Prevalence of Depression, Alcohol Abuse, 
and Cocaine Abuse Among United States Lawyers,  13 Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 233 (1990);  Andrew H. 
Benjamin et al, The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distresses Among Law 
Students and Lawyers,  1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 225 (1986).  No one will argue that the 
suppression of empathetic responses is the sole, or even the principal, cause of this harm.  
Nonetheless, it cannot be discounted as a contributing factor. 
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Hypothetical City, Iowa, who didn’t die of aspirin-related complications 
because he was taking Vioxx.176 
 
Professor Johansen notes that if Merck had told this story “— that Merck was the 
hero in this story [and] that the world is a more dangerous place without Vioxx and 
other drugs that may never make it to market – it might have resonated more 
effectively with the jury [than the more fact-based approach Merck adopted].”177   
 
In the Simpson case, the prosecution’s inability to consider the possibility that a 
jury might be unwilling to convict Simpson based on an extended domestic violence 
theory, and might be willing to set aside the logical inconsistencies of the police 
conspiracy theory offered by the defense, led to a failed prosecution.  By contrast, a 
more empathetic evaluation of the likely jury reaction to the prosecution’s domestic 
violence case theory might have led to a shorter, more focused, trial in which the 
evidence against Simpson could have been presented more directly and 
compellingly. 
 
Nussbaum sums up the value of empathy to lawyers, and the danger of suppressing 
the empathetic instinct, as follows: 
 
[T]he imagination of human predicaments is like a muscle:  It 
atrophies unless it is continually used.  And the imagination of human 
distress, fear, anger, and overwhelming grief is an important attribute 
in the law.  Lawyers need it to understand and depict effectively the 
plight of their clients.  Lawyers advising corporations need it in order 
to develop a complete picture of the likely consequences of various 
policy choices for the lives of consumers, workers, and the public at 
large, including the public in distant countries where corporations do 
business.  Factual knowledge is crucial, and in its absence the 
imagination can often steer us wrong.  But knowledge is inert without 
the ability to make situations real inside oneself, to understand their 
human meaning.178 
 
It is empathy’s ability to act as a moral compass which allows lawyers to steer an 
often difficult professional and personal course in a complicated world. 
 
Yet while the value of empathy as a professional tool for lawyers is readily 
apparent, the legal education world still behaves as if its primary, if not only, task 
is to eliminate empathy and to train its students to “think like lawyers.”  Perhaps 
                                            
176  Johansen, supra n. 58, at 80, quoting, Ted Frank,  Ernst v. Merck – One More View, (Sept. 1, 
2005), available at http://www.aei.org/article/23166. 
177  Johansen, supra n. 58, at 80. 
178  Nussbaum,  supra n. 19, at 277-78. 
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the time has come to change that approach and to consider a multi-pronged 
approach to helping law students develop their empathetic skills.  This is not to 
suggest that law students should not also be taught to think logically and clinically 
about the legal problems they are asked to confront, but it is to suggest that this 
education can be accomplished in addition to, and not at the expense of, an ability to 
think empathetically about the responses of clients and, in the case of litigation, 
juries to the facts and law of a case. 
 
 F. Developing a Sense of Empathy in Lawyers 
 
Explaining the professional benefits of empathetic lawyering is easier than 
describing what can be done about developing, or enhancing, a sense of empathy in 
current and future lawyers.  In fact, it is likely that there is no single solution to the 
conundrum of how to make lawyers more empathetic, and the best solution is to 
seek to permeate empathetic development before, during, and after law school.  And 
while much of what follows is raised in the context of the law school curriculum, 
because it is in law school that much of this non-empathetic response is learned, the 
principles underpinning the courses described here could, and perhaps should, be 
readily adopted by law firms or even by individual lawyers for their own use. 
 
  1. Empathetic Education Before Law School 
 
One of the strengths of the current legal education model is that a student can come 
to law school with no prior training or educational prerequisites.  Unlike medical 
school, with its extensive list of preliminary coursework,179 or other graduate 
programs, which typically require a strong preliminary grounding in their subject 
matter, law school imposes no formal prerequisites on its students and accepts them 
from any academic background as long as their GPA and LSAT scores indicate an 
ability to cope with the rigors of a law school education. 
 
Whether or not it desirable that law schools maintain this tradition of accepting 
students without formal prerequisites is a question for another time.  Law schools 
could, though, initiate at least an informal, and voluntary, plan of study for those 
who have already applied and been accepted into law school in order to help with 
the transition to the study of law.  In particular, while most law schools send their 
prospective students suggested reading lists for the summer before the students 
                                            
179  Harvard Medical School, for example, tells its prospective students that “[a] study . . . has 
shown that students are successful in their medical studies regardless of their undergraduate 
concentration, providing that they have had adequate science preparation.”  
http://hms.harvard.edu/admissions/default.asp?page=requirements.  “Adequate” preparation 
includes:  one year of biology, with laboratory experience, two years of chemistry, with laboratory 
experience, one year of physics, one year of calculus, and one year of expository writing.  Id.  
Students must also be “comfortable” with upper-level mathematics (through differential equations 
and linear algebra), biochemistry, and molecular biology.  Id. 
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come to law school, a more formalized and intensive course of study could help 
incoming students to practice their study skills and – more importantly, for our 
purposes – help to develop the students’ empathetic responses. 
 
There are many possible models for a pre-law school summer course.  One possible 
approach is outlined by Charles Cox and Maury Landsman.180  While Cox and 
Landsman describe their course as one taught during law school, it would be 
relatively easy to modify it to fit the looser requirements of a summer pre-law school 
course, with distance learning technology taking the place of in-class discussions. 
 
In the class they describe, students are given a one-page summary of the facts of a 
case, but are not given any law from the case, and are asked to discuss “[w]hat 
should  the law be [and] [w]hy?”181  The authors note that they aim to “help the 
students learn that they can resolve what the law should be, and usually is, just by 
‘thinking it through.’  The technique is simple:  focus on the facts of the case and 
remember that the law is only answers to human problems. . . .”182  Cox and 
Landsman require the students to read two chapter of John Noonan’s Persons and 
Masks of the Law183 and note that through the reading of “the extensive unreported 
facts of the widely known Palsgraf case,” the students “get a look at the many 
factors outside the law that may, and arguable do or should, affect a decision. . . .”184 
 
Cox and Landsman’s course, which they have apparently taught to general acclaim 
at the University of Minnesota Law School for several years,185 points out a way in 
which students can be introduced to key aspects of the legal process without losing 
sight of the importance of the facts – both disclosed and undisclosed and related and 
unrelated to the specific circumstances of the case186 – to the actual, as opposed to 
aspirational, outcome of the case.  This approach is fundamentally empathetic, and 
yet does not impede the development of the students’ ability to think like lawyers.  
If anything, it enhances that ability by allowing the students to explore a deeper, 
more nuanced approach to decision-making than that typically offered in the 
traditional first-year torts class.  If the students had taken this class before entering 
                                            
180  Charles A. Cox, Sr. & Maury S. Landsman,  Learning the Law by Avoiding It in the Process:  
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181  Id. at 342. 
182  Id. at 341. 
183  JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.  PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW:  CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON, AND 
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184  Cox & Landsman, supra n. 180, at 344 (emphasis in original). 
185  Id.  at 341. 
186  Cox and Landsman point out specifically Noonan’s observation that, at the time of the 
Palsgraf decision, Justice Cardozo harbored “ambitions to influence the content of the First 
Restatement of Torts.”  Cox & Landsman, supra n. 180, at 344, citing Noonan, supra n. 183, at 149-
50. 
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into the formal study of torts, their Socratic discussions with their professors would 
likely have been more complex and more interesting for both students and teacher. 
 
Another course studying the way we make decisions, and one that could also be 
adapted to fit into a summer pre-law school schedule, is described by Martha 
Nussbaum.187  The course, called, descriptively enough, “Decisionmaking,” is taught 
jointly by Nussbaum and Professor Douglas Baird, “an expert in the application of 
game theory to the law.188 
 
Addressing both the analytical and the normative ethical aspects of 
good decision-making in public life, we acquaint the students with 
expected utility theory, game theory, and the new behavioral law and 
economics.  We have many students who basically think ethics is a 
“soft” subject.  But we then get them reading Kant, Mill, and Aristotle, 
and odder authors still, such as Henry James, and Mahasweta Devi.  I 
am optimistic about the ability of courses such as this to expose a wide 
range of law students to good normative reasoning.189 
 
A course like this, in which students read and discuss – both with each other and 
with a teacher – a carefully selected group of texts that allow them to explore the 
nature of decision-making, would serve the traditional law school goal of helping the 
students develop their critical, logical skills, but could also help the students 
understand that logical decisions are made in an ethical, and empathetic, context. 
 
A third approach to a summer course might take one or more pieces of extended 
litigations – the Simpson, Ernst, and Triangle Waist Company cases discussed here 
are three possible examples, but there are many more –  and have the students 
study and discuss both the facts and the various strategies adopted by the attorneys 
and why they were, or were not, successful.  This type of course would allow the 
students to begin the careful reading they will need to employ in their law school 
classes, but would also encourage their empathetic responses to the material and 
might challenge their expectations that logical trial strategies and tactics are 
always the best ones. 
 
This type of course runs close to a law and literature approach – in this case, with 
the law as literature – and that model is another that might successfully be used in 
a pre-law school summer course.  This type of course – described in Professor 
Reichman’s evaluation of the influence of Martha Nussbaum’s Poetic Justice190 – 
                                            
187  Nussbaum, supra, n. 19, at 274-75. 
188  Id., at 274. 
189  Id., at 274-75. 
190  MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,  POETIC JUSTICE:  THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 
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would deal with decision making or, perhaps more accurately, the deferral of 
decision making, and would involve the study of literature and the lessons it can 
teach lawyers.191  This type of course is well-suited to students who are still novices 
in the current legal education model, and as Reichman observes, “[p]erhaps it is 
time to recognize the need for teaching literature and the literary approach to law 
as part of the introductory classes in law, in a separate and mandatory course 
where literary methods will be taught systematically and with a critical 
approach.”192 
 
A course of this type would involve the reading of literature specifically as a means 
of stimulating the students’ empathetic responses. 
 
The main thesis [of Nussbaum’s Poetic Justice] is that the reading of 
literature – an ethical reading – arouses empathy, and that this 
empathy allows for better judgment. . . .  Developing the capacity to 
exercise empathetic judgment in literature will also serve legal 
judgment,.  It will allow for judgment is neutral but not aloof, sensitive 
but uncompromising on moral principles, personal but not capricious 
(or idiosyncratic), but not overbearing of diffident.  Focusing on works 
by Dickens, Whitman, and Wright, Nussbaum provides guidelines for 
properly reading literature as an exercise of developing empathetic 
judgment. . . . 193 
 
Such a course would be particularly valuable to students before they develop fully-
formed legal-logical reflexes, because it would encourage them to withhold 
judgment rather than to exercise the immediate judgment often called for in law 
school classes.  As Reichman notes, 
 
[o]ne of the basic components of human culture is the constantly 
exercised capacity for making judgments.  We are quick to judge:  we 
easily determine the reality presented before us, often without pausing 
                                            
191  I would have explicitly acknowledged this as a “law and literature” class but for Professor 
Nussbaum’s reservations about that label.  “I used to teach [a Law and Literature] course, and I now 
no longer do.  The name ‘Law and Literature’ denotes no clearly demarcated subject matter.  My 
course did have a definite subject matter:  It was the role played by compassion and empathy in the 
law, and I pursued that theme through literary . . . and legal texts of many kinds.  But, not 
surprisingly (despite the fact that  I thought I had described the course clearly enough) students 
came to the course not expecting a sustained philosophical examination of the emotions, and 
expecting instead a lighter, more entertaining kind of course about literary representations of legal 
situations.  Perhaps that sort of problem can be solved, but I think one cannot rely for the training I 
would like to promote, on elective courses of this nature, however well designed.”  Nussabum, supra 
n. 19, at 278. 
192  Reichman, supra n. 2, at 302. 
193  Id., at 303. 
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to reflect whether what appears (or is presented) as real is indeed real.  
We swiftly identify the good and the bad, often resorting to simplistic 
labels and categories, and frequently do so based on a number of 
assumptions and shortcuts – rules of thumb – the validity of which we 
generally do not bother to check.”194 
 
But while it is easy for students to reach judgments about what is and is not a 
logically correct decision, such immediate responses tend to ignore the more 
empathetic question of what the “correct” decision, viewed in a broader context, 
might be.  By contrast, literature forces us to slow down our decision-making facility 
and to assimilate more information before we reach our conclusions about 
appropriate outcomes. 
 
Good literature, unlike superficial or programmatic literature, exposes 
the reader to the complexity of the human condition even by telling a 
simple story.  The novel, especially because it is a figment of the 
imagination, calls first for withholding factual judgment.  The readers 
are aware that the story they have before them is not a true story, but 
they are prepared to treat it as plausible – as long as it intertwines the 
kind of events that seem conceivable, based on the cultural horizon and 
human nature with which they are familiar.  The suspension of 
disbelief is not expressed merely in accepting the fictional story as 
possible, but also by the various sources from which we are willing to 
receive information within the story.195 
 
Moreover, literature allows us – uniquely – the chance to insert ourselves into 
another (albeit fictional) person’s mind and hear their thoughts: 
 
[T]he vast majority of novels directly present to readers their main 
characters’ thoughts, and we have learned to accept that as perfectly 
natural.  One of the pleasures of reading novels is the enjoyment of 
being told what a variety of fictional people are thinking.  It is a relief 
from the business of real life, much of which requires the ability to 
decode accurately the behavior of others.196   
 
One of the benefits of literature to law students is the opportunities it offers to 
practice this empathetic decoding of real-life behavior by providing fictional 
examples for study, reflection, and discussion.   
 
                                            
194  Id., at 304. 
195  Id., at 305. 
196  Alan Palmer,  The Construction of Fictional Minds  10 Narrative 28, 29 (2002). 
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It might be imagined that law students have already experienced the benefits of 
literature well before they come to law school.  But this is not a safe assumption.  A 
recent study suggests that “[l]ess than half of the adult American population now 
reads literature”197 and that literary reading had declined by 10% between 1982 and 
2002.198  A snapshot picture of some of the incoming law school class of 2006199 
suggests that the situation with law students is a little better than the national 
average, with 5% responding that they had read for pleasure more than one book a 
week,  20.4% responding that they read one book a week, 31.8% responding that 
they had read one book a month, 26.2% responding that they had read more than 
one book a year, although fewer than one book a month, 3.5% responding that they 
had read one book a year, and 1.6% responding that they had read fewer than one 
book a year.200 
 
Although these data suggest that law students’ literary reading is higher than the 
national average, though, they are still not cause for celebration.  Based on this 
survey’s results, fully 60% of responding incoming law students indicated that they 
read for pleasure one book or fewer each month.  For those who celebrate the ability 
of literature to deliver important information about empathy and decision-making, 
such a reading rate would appear to be depressingly low. 
 
These results mirror a decline in empathy found in American college students.  In a 
meta-analysis of American college students announced at the annual meeting of the 
Association for Psychological Science, researchers concluded that college students 
today score “40% lower than their counterparts of 20 or 30 years ago, as measured 
by standard tests of this personality trait.”201  The authors of the study suggest 
several possible reasons for this decline, including exposure to violent media and 
the advent of social media.202   
                                            
197  NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ADULT 
LITERACY:  A FIRST LOOK AT THE LITERACY OF AMERICA’S ADULTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY, ix (2005) 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/NAAL/PDF/2006470.PDF. 
198  Id.  Only 56.6% of American adults had read any book in the year the survey was conducted 
and only 46.6% had read a work of literature, broadly defined as any novel, short story, poem, or 
play.  Id. at ix, 1-2. 
199  The survey polled students coming to seven law schools:  Syracuse University College of Law, 
Washington College of Law, Marquette University Law School, Rutgers School of Law, Camden, 
Thomas Jefferson School of Law, John Marshall Law School, and the University of Baltimore School 
of Law.  Ian Gallacher,  “Who Are These Guys?”:  The Results of a Survey Studying the Information 
Literacy of Incoming Law Students, 151 155, n. 12 (2007). 
200  Id. at 169. 
201  Rick Nauert,  Compassion on the Decline Among College Students, Psych Central (June 4, 
2010), available at http://psychcentral.com/news/2010/06/01/compassion-on-the-decline-among-
college-students/14210.html;  Edward H. O’Brien, Courtney Hsing, & Sara Konrath,  Changes in 
Dispositional Empathy over Time in American College Students:  A Meta-Analysis, available at, 
http://sitemaker.umich.edu/skonrath/files/empathy_decline.pdf. 
202  Nauert, Compassion on the Decline, supra n. 201. 
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Whatever the reasons for this apparently dramatic drop in empathetic response, we 
are confronted by the reality that law students are likely significantly less 
empathetic coming in to law school than were their predecessors, and that they also 
appear to be reading less.  Developing pre-law school law and literature courses in 
which students could participate before coming to law school would go some way to 
remedying the literature gap, and might help improve student empathetic 
responses as well. 
 
Allowing law students to confront the complexity inherent in the decision-making 
process, and equipping them with the tools to make more nuanced, informed 
decisions about the cases they begin to read on the first day of law school, would 
encourage them to remember that logic need not be divorced from empathy, and 
that the two types of decision making can coexist.  In essence, this approach to legal 
education gives the students access to the “switch of ethical and human concern” 
the Carnegie Report’s authors write of,203 and would allow them to control when the 
switch is flipped on or off. 
 
  2. Empathetic Education in Law School 
 
Useful though such pre-law school courses might be, they would have more impact 
if they were followed up by some law school curricular reforms that allowed the 
messages the pre-law students had learned to be enhanced and developed by 
courses in law school as well.  These changes might include not just a greater 
appreciation for the importance of empathy in the traditional doctrinal courses 
where, researchers have noted, it is generally ignored, but also additional 
programming devoted to the restoration of the balance between empathy and logic. 
 
The pre-law school summer courses discussed above could be adapted for inclusion 
in the regular law school curriculum.  Indeed, both the Cox and Landsman204 and 
Nussbaum205 courses were designed as elective courses in law school curricula and 
would require adaptation to be taught as pre-law school courses.  The location of 
these, and other non-doctrinal, courses in the traditional upper-class law school 
curriculum is less than desirable, though, while better than nothing, would be more 
effective and beneficial to students if they could be part of the first year curriculum. 
 
There already is at least one course that helps students develop their empathetic 
senses in the typical law school first year curriculum, although it is usually thought 
to have a different function.  The legal research and writing course required by most 
                                            
203  Carnegie Report, supra n. 17, at 141. 
204  Supra nn. 180-86 and accompanying text. 
205  Supra nn. 187-95 and accompanying text. 
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law schools206 typically involve a combination of classroom instruction and written 
assignments using simulations to recreate client problems that must be analyzed by 
the students.  Although these assignments are developed to reinforce lessons of 
structure and analysis that are taught in the legal writing classroom, they can be 
designed to stimulate a student’s empathetic response by contextualizing legal 
analysis more realistically than can be achieved in the typical doctrinal class 
laboratory setting. 
 
Writing, after all, is – or should be – an exercise in applied empathy.  In order to 
persuade a reader of something, whether it be the accuracy of a set of facts, a legal 
interpretation, or the believability of a fictional account, a writer must attempt to 
place him or herself in the mind of the reader and try to imagine the reader’s 
response to the written material.207  It is precisely this skill which lawyers must 
develop in order to communicate effectively, and this collateral benefit to legal 
writing courses in law school should be recognized and emphasized in law school 
curricula by expanding the number of legal writing courses offered to students. 
 
Valuable though this pre-clinical engagement with a more empathetic approach to 
legal analysis is, though, it alone is likely not enough to counter the force of the 
more purely logical approach employed in most doctrinal courses.  And while those 
courses can, and should, be taught in a way that incorporates both the doctrinal 
lessons to be distilled from case law and the more human lessons to be drawn from 
the facts surrounding those cases,208 an additional, required, course in the first year 
                                            
206  The American Bar Association (“ABA”) Standards for legal education require that law 
schools provide substantial instruction in “writing in a legal context, including at least one rigorous 
writing experience in the first year and at least one additional rigorous writing experience after the 
first year.”  ABA Standards for Approval of Law Schools, Standard 302(2)(3), available at Council 
Standards, Chapter 3, available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/20082009. 
StandardsWebContent/Chapter%203.pdf.  This standard is satisfied, in most law schools, by a course 
in legal research and writing.  See, Association of Legal Writing Directors & Legal Writing Institute. 
Report of the Annual Legal Writing Survey, 2010, at 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.alwd.org/surveys/survey_results/2010_Survey_Results.pdf (indicating that 181 law 
schools teach legal writing in the fall semester and 184 schools teach legal writing in the spring 
207  See, e.g., Trimble, supra, n. 71, at 5-6 (“The writer . . . after realizing that a world – the 
reader – exists out there beyond himself, slowly comes to develop, first, an awareness of himself from 
the reader’s vantage point (objectivity);  next, a capacity to put himself imaginatively in the mind of 
the reader (empathy);  and finally, an appreciation of the reader’s rights and feelings (courtesy).”) 
208  The recent publication of a series of books that go into more depth about the facts of cases 
than do the often terse factual summary offered by the courts is an encouraging sign.  These books, 
published by Foundation Press, include the Trial Stories volume discussed at n. 76, supra, and also 
have volumes covering, for example, Administrative Law, Antitrust, Business Tax, Civil Procedure, 
Constitutional Law, Evidence, Labor Law, and Torts.  These books, used in conjunction with more 
typical casebooks, offer at least one model by which the human implications implicit in all court 
decisions could be discussed in doctrinal classes. 
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of law school that focuses on the empathetic, and, perhaps, ethical209 aspects of law 
practice would be of tremendous benefit to the students.   
 
Locating such a course in the first year, and ideally in the first semester, would 
allow it to serve as a valuable counterweight to the more dispassionate lessons 
typically taught in doctrinal courses.  Although students often have access to 
courses that engage some or all of this material in the upper-class curriculum,210 the 
damage is, by then, likely done and the students will likely have difficulty 
reintegrating a more empathetic approach to analysis into their newly-created 
lawyer personas. 
 
I use “damage” intentionally here.  Some have speculated that the analytical 
approach employed by law schools in the first year contributes to the well-
documented psychological harm211 suffered by many first year law students.212  And 
while it would be fanciful to assert that a course requiring a more balanced 
approach to analysis would cancel-out the potentially negative effects of the more 
traditional law school pedagogical style, it would at least alert the students that 
empathy is not forbidden to lawyers and that an empathetic approach to legal and 
factual analysis can be an important aspect of a lawyer’s work. 
                                            
209  By using “ethical” to describe this possible course, I intend to make a conscious distinction 
between such a course and the more circumscribed “professional responsibility” courses that form a 
typical part of the second year law student’s experience. 
210  Even if a law school has a “law and literature” elective course in its curriculum, such a 
course is often not available to all students in that school.  See, e.g., Reichman, supra n. 2, at 301.  
Reichmann notes that Harvard University, New York University, and the University of 
Pennsylvania “only provide one elective law and literature class to the juris doctorate candidates, 
each being limited to fifteen and eighteen students.”  Id., n. 16.  In addition, in the academic year 
2004-05, several schools did not offer a law and literature class at all, including “Stanford 
University, Yale University, the University of Chicago, Cornell University, the University of 
California at Berkeley, and Vanderbilt University.” Id.  Of course, Nussbaum’s retreat from the “law 
and literature” term (see n. 191) might why there was no such named class at the University of 
Chicago. 
211  For a discussion of some of the psychological harm suffered by first year law students, and 
the possible causes for such harm, see, e.g.:  Nancy Soonpa,  Stress in Law Students:  A Comparative 
Study of First-Year, Second-Year, and Third-Year Students,  36 U. Conn. L. Rev.  355 (2003-04);  
Ruth Ann McKinney,  Depression and Anxiety in Law Students:  Are We Part of the Problem and Can 
We Be Part of the Solution?  8 J. Legal Writing Inst.. 229 (2002);  Krieger, supra n. 36, Suzanne C. 
Segerstrom,  Perceptions of Stress and Control in the First Semester of Law School,  32 Willamette L. 
Rev. 593 (1996);  Peter Kutulakis,  Stress and Competence:  From Law Student to Professional,  21 
Cap. U. L. Rev. 835 (1992);  B.A. Glesner,  Fear and Loathing in the Law Schools,  23 Conn. L. Rev. 
627 (1991);  Andrew H. Benjamin et al, The Role of Legal Education in Producing Psychological 
Distresses Among Law Students and Lawyers,  1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 225 (1986);  Lawrence 
Silver, Anxiety and the First Semester of Law School, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 1201 (1968). 
212  See, e.g.,  Gerald F. Hess,  Heads and Hearts:  The Teaching and Learning Environment in 
Law School,  52 J. Legal Educ. 75, 75-6 (2002)(“Causes of student distress include the overwhelming 
workload, intimidating classroom dynamics, excessive competition, astronomical debt, personal 
isolation, lack of feedback, and the nearly exclusive emphasis on linear, logical, doctrinal analysis.”) 
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  3. Empathetic Education After Law School 
 
Some might question the notion that law schools have a role to play in legal 
education after their students graduate.  There is enough to do, they might argue, 
in the three years the students are in school.  Once law students walk across the 
stage with their degrees in hand and are transformed before the faculty’s eyes into 
alumni, the law school’s responsibility for their active education has ceased.  
 
Certainly it is true that a law school’s formal educational role, as with any academic 
institution, ends with the graduation of its students.  But law schools could, and 
perhaps should, continue to offer opportunities for their former students to continue 
their legal education after graduation.  Many schools already offer continuing legal 
educational opportunities as part of their alumni reunions or other law school 
events, and adding training in empathy as one of the programs offered, or as part of 
other programs, should pose little challenge.  Law schools might also consider 
introducing on-line programs, based on courses, such as law and literature courses 
already taught at the school, that would help alumni, wherever they might be 
physically located, to improve or perhaps develop their empathetic skills.  Such 
courses are not difficult to set-up, would not fall foul of the American Bar 
Association’s limitations on on-line courses offered as part of a J.D. program,213 and 
would offer alumni not only a chance to stay in touch with their law schools but also 
a chance to engage in a discussion – with faculty and with each other – about how to 
communicate better with non-lawyers.  Programs like this could serve both an 
educational and a broader, humanizing, role and would benefit the alumni who 
participated in them and the law schools that offered them.214 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The ubiquity of the Langdellian approach in contemporary legal education has 
made it difficult, if not impossible, for law schools to contemplate alternatives to it.  
Robert Berring has traced this effect – what might be called the ontological power of 
classification – from Blackstone, through Langdell, and down to today.215  Berring 
notes that in Blackstone’s time, the common law “was a hodge-podge of local 
                                            
213  ABA Standard 306 (c) provides that students in accredited law school programs may not take 
more than four credit hours in any one semester, or more than twelve credit hours total.  
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/2009-2010%20StandardsWebContent/Chapter3.pdf, at 28-
29. 
214  The obvious benefits to law schools would include continued contact with a group of alumni 
interested in participating in, and benefiting from, law school activities, as well as the general sense 
of good-will generated by a school that is sufficiently interested in its alumni to create special 
programming for them. 
215  Robert Berring,  Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts,  2 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 305 (2000). 
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practice and custom.216  Blackstone’s achievement, according to Berring, was to take 
“a messy smorgasbord of common law doctrines and practice and organize it into a 
comprehensible series of propositions.  He supplied a structure of categories and 
concepts that fit the existing data.”217 
 
It was this framework of common law doctrines, an artificial construct for 
Blackstone’s pedagogical purposes, that Langdell seized on and expanded in his 
development of Harvard’s law school curriculum.  “A close examination of Langdell’s 
work in shaping the law school curriculum – a curriculum that persists today – 
shows that it is a descendant of Blackstone’s universe.  Langdell’s belief that law 
was at heart scientific, and subject to discovery through the reading of common law 
cases, flowed smoothly from Blackstone.”218 
 
And, indeed, it is a testament to both Blackstone and Langdell’s conception, and the 
power of the classification structure they helped to create, that it survives virtually 
intact over one hundred years after its introduction at Harvard.  But therein lies 
the problem, because one of the side-effects of powerful classification systems is 
their ability to blind us to other possibilities.  “Good, useable systems disappear 
almost by definition.  The easier they are to use, the harder they are to see.”219 
 
Eventually classification decisions that were once based on the banal 
realties of constructing a workable sorting process transform that very 
process.  Now this early decision becomes the only possible outcome;  
the result appears to be natural.  Indeed, those using the system see no 
decision at all.  Because those who use the system tend to 
conceptualize in terms of the system and, as a system matures, it 
becomes authoritative, the classification system simply describes the 
universe.220 
 
The gradual reification of Langdell’s approach to American legal education presents 
significant challenges for those seeking to propose changes.  Put simply, it is 
difficult to imagine an alternative approach, let alone persuade that such an 
alternative is feasible.  As Berring observes, we live in a legal world which is, in 
effect “a conceptual universe of thinkable thoughts that has enormous power.  
Indicative of its real strength is the fact that those using it do not appear to perceive 
                                            
216  Id.,  at 308. 
217  Id.  As Berring observes, some have argued that Blackstone took much of his methodology 
from others.  Id., n. 7.  Berring concludes, though, that this is “not worth bothering about.  It was 
Blackstone’s version that changed the way the law was conceptualized and that is what matters.”  
Id. 
218  Id., at 309. 
219  Id., at 310, quoting GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STARR, SORTING THINGS OUT:  
CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 33 (1999). 
220  Berring, supra n. 215, at 310. 
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it;  the classification of legal concepts appears inevitable.”221  To consider changes in 
this universe is, almost literally, unthinkable. 
 
Yet that should nonetheless be the task of legal educators and the broader 
community of lawyers.  As Martha Nussbaum reminds us, one of the necessary 
qualities for a citizen in a pluralistic democracy is that we lead “the ‘examined 
life,’”222 and while Nussbaum was writing about law students, her observation 
surely applies to law school faculties and lawyers as well.  Difficult though it is for 
faculty members, who have gained so much by working within the Langdellian 
construct of what a law school curriculum should be, and for lawyers, who were 
trained, and succeeded, in that Langdellian model, they should examine the value, 
or lack of value, in its continued vitality in a contemporary world and should be 
willing to modify or abandon it if they can come up with a better approach. 
 
No one will argue with Nussbaum that “[l]egal education is specialized professional 
training, not a general preparation for citizenship and life,”223 nor with Professor 
Johnson when he notes that “a law degree is not supposed to be a substitute for a 
good advanced liberal arts degree.224  The problem is that even assuming law 
students all came to law school with well-developed liberal arts backgrounds that 
would allow them to consider the issues and concerns of the law on an empathetic 
basis,225 law schools intentionally and systematically prevents students from 
responding emotionally during their first year of law school, making empathy 
difficult or even distasteful for them.  The upper-level curricula at most law schools 
might take some steps to transfuse some sense of empathy back into the students 
during their second and third year of law school, but the harm, by and large, has 
already been done. 
 
This approach generally succeeds in teaching students to “think like lawyers,” and 
it provides them with a grounding in doctrinal knowledge that will allow them to 
function as lawyers upon graduation.  But this approach also costs students, both 
personally and professionally, by making it difficult, if not impossible, for them to 
                                            
221  Id.,  at 311. 
222  Nussbaum,  supra n. 9, at, 320. 
223  Id., at 323. 
224  Johnson, supra n. 171, at 1251.  Professor Johnson goes on to note that “[a]s a colleague 
pointed out to me, if a law degree were merely a broad liberal arts degree, we would have difficulty 
defending the fact that we pay law professors approximately double what we pay liberal arts 
professors.  Law school is not liberal-arts graduate school;  we pay law professors high salaries 
because teaching law is different from teaching other disciplines.”  Id. at 1251-52. 
225  This is by no means a reasonable assumption.  It ignores, for example, the plethora of law 
students with backgrounds other than in the liberal arts, and the emphasis on “well-developed” 
ignores the variable quality of liberal arts education in this country.  See, e.g.,  Richard P. Vance & 
Robert W. Pritchard,  Measuring Cultural Knowledge of Law Students,  42 J. Legal Educ. 233, 235 
(1992)(students performed “poorly” in a test of their cultural knowledge.)   
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think like anyone else.  The process makes it difficult, at least for junior lawyers, to 
communicate with, or think like, the non-lawyers who are their clients, their 
witnesses, and their juries.  Ironically, the process of training law students to “think 
like lawyers” might make it more difficult for them to do a lawyer’s work. 
 
Left to their own devices, it is unlikely that law school faculties will embrace change 
enthusiastically.  And while the Carnegie Report presages a more determined 
assault on law school pedagogy than has been seen in a while, it seems likely that 
any changes that result will be grudging and incremental, rather than whole-
hearted and extensive.  But another, significant, pressure group exists, and its 
mobilization could persuade law schools to make faster, comprehensive, and willing 
changes to the way they teach. 
 
Alumni are a crucial constituency who have tremendous influence, both as donors to 
their law schools and as employers of their more recent graduates, in the way legal 
education is delivered.  If alumni were to recognize the professional value that 
would accrue if newly-minted lawyers came out of law schools with a more nuanced, 
empathetic, sense of decision-making and analysis, and were to ask legal educators 
and law school administrators to take more note of empathy in law school classes, it 
is difficult to imagine law schools not taking close notice of their opinions. 
 
Changing a pedagogical approach so generally accepted as law school’s “signature” 
pedagogical approach226 will not be easy, but change is possible, and, once law 
schools concede the need for it,  could come relatively quickly:  models exist, in the 
form of the law and literature and legal skills curricula, that can help point the way 
towards the necessary changes.  Such changes could go some way to plugging the 
evident gaps in cultural literacy displayed by law students227 and could help provide 
them with the tools necessary to make better decisions on behalf of their clients.  
We all – lawyers and non-lawyers alike – would benefit from a recognition that 
empathy is just as important to a lawyer’s work as is logical analysis. 
                                            
226  Carnegie Report supra n. 17, at 24. 
227  As Professors Vance and Pritchard note, “[l]aw schools alone cannot make up the deficits in 
cultural literacy that we are finding [in law students].  Courses in legal ethics and legal history can 
help.  Continual exposure to interdisciplinary perspectives appears to be more crucial than ever, 
given the apparent lack of such exposure in students’ earlier experiences.  But professional education 
cannot replace adequate preparation in high schools and colleges.”  Vance & Pritchard,  supra,  n. 
225, at 239.  But their solution – that law schools “ought to demand that the educational process 
yield a more culturally literate product.” (id.) – is too facile and lets us off the hook too easily.  
Certainly the apparent rapid decline in cultural education is deeply disturbing, and certainly 
American high schools and colleges should be mobilizing to address it.  But even if such changes are 
addressed in the school system, law schools cannot wait the ten to fifteen years it will take for any 
changes made today i to show up in their incoming class.  They, too, have an obligation to address 
the problem. 
 
